


For Reference

NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

70E-9

Ex LIBRIS
UNIVERSITATIS
ALBERTAENSIS





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
University of Alberta Library

<https://archive.org/details/Azab1970>

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION,

A CASE STUDY: THE EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN UNION

by



Naguib Azab

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1970

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend
to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION,
A CASE STUDY: THE EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN UNION
submitted by Naguib Azab in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere thanks to the Political Science Department and to the University of Alberta not only for their academic help but also for their humanistic support.

For these reasons, I am indebted to a number of persons whom I wish to mention: Dr. Christian Bay, Dr. Grant Davy, Prof. Fred Engelmann, Prof. Robert Gilsdorf, Prof. Leslie Green, Dr. Henry Kreisel, Prof. J. Peter Meekison, and Prof. Robert Melvin.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Juris Lejnieks, my supervisor, for his keen insight, helpful guidance and personal interest.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
PART I. THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION	
I. DEFINITIONS OF INTEGRATION	4
II. APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INTEGRATION	9
The Institutional Approach	9
The Sociological Approach	11
Integration (Federalism) As A Process	27
Integration As A Bargain: Political Approach	38
PART II. A CASE STUDY: THE EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN UNION	
I. SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH	69
Religion	69
The Emergence of Arab Nationalism	69
Revitalization of Islam (1838-1905 Afghani and Mohamed Abdu)	71
Secularization (the 1919 Revolution)	72
The Military Stage: Manipulation of Religion	74
Culture	79
Ideology	85
Arab Socialism	92
Freedom of Association	93
Land Reform and Nationalization	97
II. INTEGRATION AS A PROCESS.	104
III. INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH	113
IV. POLITICAL APPROACH	117
External Threat	117
External Power Interests	119
Price and Rewards	120
Loss of Sovereignty	120
Administrative Problems	123
Loss of Political Power	126
Loss of Economic Power	131
Rewards, Capabilities and Political Issues	135

V. CONCLUSIONS 137

FOOTNOTES 142

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 156

INTRODUCTION

Political scientists have paid a great deal of attention to the subject of integration in the post-World War II era. This concern is due to the problem of war and peace in the nuclear age, the technological revolution in communications, and the effects of ideologies cutting across national boundaries.

Ours is a transitional age. It could be argued that the developments in international organizations possessing supranational powers, the evolving place of the individual in the international legal system, the doctrine of the 'just war', the development of the concept of human rights, the responsibility of policy-makers to a higher law--say natural law--are manifestations of an era of change which may help the development of international cooperation and integration. It could also be argued however that all these developments cannot challenge the reality of the sovereignty of the national state, symbolizing 'interest in terms of power' to use Morgenthau's phrase.

Though the present doctrine of integration represents a challenge to the traditional system of the national state, one should not by any means deduce that it is a revolutionary idea, from the political or sociological point of view. The nature of any system is determined by the political and sociological forces which bring it into being. Integration may be uncommitted. Jean Monnet wrote that "the large market does not¹ prejudice the future economic systems of Europe." Yet the Social Democrats in Germany claimed that the E.C.S.C. would lead to a supercartel of international big business and to the subjugation of the Federal

Republic to the control of a "Black International" of Conservative Roman Catholic parties."²

An 'Empire' may be seen as an integrative, dominating force. As Karl Deutsch points out, amalgamation has sometimes been accomplished by mere conquest, and maintained by force and fear.³ The process "from Empire to Nation", to use Emerson's phrase, can be regarded as a disintegrative force, representing the era of independence and the end of colonialism.

International communism can be an integrative force--and a committed one--though in Morgenthau's opinion "the disintegration of national solidarity can hardly be called a retreat from nationalism, for it exchanges loyalty to a foreign nation for loyalty to one's own." Nevertheless, this international communism has been challenged recently by the revival of nationalism, which plays once again the role of a 'disintegrative force within empires'. The monolithic world-Communist movement, directed by, and at the service of the Soviet Union, has been replaced by 'polycentrism' in which national loyalties and interests take precedence over affinities of political philosophy.⁴

To avoid commitment, which would lead to ideological conflict, European integrationists claim that integration "is not a blueprint, it is not a theory, it is a process that has already begun", to use Monnet's phrase.⁵ This is a 'romantic' approach, it implies a sense of destiny or determinism. True, integration is a process, but can it be studied in isolation from sociological and political homogeneity as a precondition for integration? Can the integrated system be isolated from the 'goal' as a cornerstone of any system (using the Parsonian model)?

The process of integration does not work by itself; it depends

on the political forces, the perceptions of other elites, and mass opinion. The outcome of all these factors determines the political nature of the system. Since integration by its nature is a socio-logical, institutional and political process, it is necessary to deal with its theoretical problems from these different approaches and then apply the findings to the unification of Egypt and Syria in order to determine what the most important factors affecting integration are.

PART I

THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION

I - DEFINITIONS OF INTEGRATION

I shall begin with Deutsch's definition of integration, as it has been the object of criticism by other writers, and then proceed to analyse and evaluate the differences between the opinions put forth by various writers.

Deutsch states that "by integration, we mean the attainment within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of peaceful changes among its population."⁶

Ernst Haas holds that the presence of a specified institutional structure is the cornerstone of the definition, whereas "Deutsch's concept does not insist on the presence of a specified institutional structure."⁷

It seems to be merely a matter of emphasis on the "specified institutional structure", for Deutsch's definition did include "the attainment of institutions strong enough..."

We should try to understand what kind of institutional structure Haas specifies and emphasizes, since this is the cornerstone of his definition and his criticism of Deutsch. In Haas' words, his "concept of political community is broader than Deutsch's amalgamated security community because it includes the possibility of a constant flow of obedience to control decisions made by intergovernmental agencies".⁸ The type of confederation represented by international organizations is not included in his definition, however. Nor is the pluralistic security community, because of the absence of judicial, administrative and legislative ties.

This writer is inclined to disagree with Haas' criticism of Deutsch. A deeper study of Deutsch would show that this criticism is groundless. Deutsch did take into consideration this type of specific institutional structures, i.e. intergovernmental agencies. He used the term 'functionalism' to mean all cases of 'partial amalgamation'. Whether a particular function or institution is so important that its pooling with another government would have the effect of over-all amalgamation rather than partial,--and thus take it out of the field of functionalism--depends on the importance of this particular function or institution.⁹ Thus partial amalgamation includes the functions of intergovernmental agencies which constitute the cornerstone of Haas' definition.

The difference between the definitions given by Deutsch and Haas derives from the fact that Deutsch's study was historical and comparative. As a result, his definition was necessarily made broad enough to cover the variety of cases studied, ranging from pluralistic to amalgamated communities and including partial amalgamations as well. Such an approach leads the author to give a greater role to societal and political factors which would be the only basis for considering a pluralistic community as integrated, though it lacks the necessary institutional structure. But this does not imply by any means that Deutsch and his associates ignored the institutional structure expressed in the idea of a partial or over-all amalgamated community.

Haas held that integration is a process leading toward a condition of political community in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time, and in a definable

geographic space." This limited approach, with respect to time and space, is apt to lead the author to emphasize the functionalist factor expressed by the institutional structure, whereas the historical and comparative approach of Deutsch gives a larger role to the societal and political factors, beside the legal and formal approach.

This analysis leads to a better understanding of Amitai Etzioni's 'paradigm' for the study of integration. He assumed that Deutsch and his associates see "a union as amalgamated once a common government has been established, whereas for him the term 'union' is used to refer to international systems whose level and scope of integration is lower than that of fully integrated systems (referred to as political communities) yet higher than international systems whose level and scope of integration is low, such as most international organizations."

It might be interesting to note that Etzioni's criticism of Deutsch is based on the assumption that Deutsch considered the union or amalgamation as being equivalent to integration once a common government has been established, while Haas, as previously explained, criticised Deutsch for not insisting on the institutional structure. So, broadly speaking, Deutsch was criticised by Etzioni for insisting on the institutional structure, while he was criticised by Haas for not insisting on the institutional structure. In fact, Etzioni and Haas each saw only one side of Deutsch's argument, and a different one at that.

Notwithstanding these contradictions, the writer is inclined to believe that a legal amalgamation--which is an institutional approach--may comprise the social and political elements of disintegration. The apparent case is the historical example of empires. The tacit cases in modern times are those in which an elite unit practises its hegemony over

the amalgamated parts. On the basis of this analysis, we may come to the conclusion that Etzioni's criticism should be directed towards Haas rather than Deutsch, since the former insisted on the institutional structure as the cornerstone, whereas the latter's definition was so broad that it included the social and political factors, and not only the formal institutional structure, since he mentioned both pluralistic and amalgamated communities as forms of integration.

However, it is very doubtful that Etzioni's criticism of Deutsch is correct. The latter wrote, "Where amalgamation occurs without integration, of course a security-community does not exist."¹² By this Deutsch means that amalgamation is not equivalent to integration, which is the same argument given by Etzioni when criticising Deutsch.

There may be one criticism of Deutsch's definition, however. For him integration means the attainment of a sense of community, and this in turn means that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change" without resort to large scale physical force.

It does not lie within the scope of the present study to trace the causes of violence and resentment in a community, but broadly speaking, with respect to the problem of integration, a violent revolution may attempt to change the social structure without affecting the "sense of community". And a government, whether central or federal, may crush such a revolution, whether social or separatist, violently on behalf of the community. Whenever there is an integrated community, the government has a relatively freer hand, and the sense of community allows it to resort to force, on the basis that the matter is an internal one. In a less integrated community there are restraints on the use of force, for

it is no longer an entirely internal affair if the case is one of integration between two sovereign countries. To give an illustration, the U.A.R. President would not hesitate to crush any so-called 'counter-revolution' in the Egyptian community, which is highly integrated; but in the less integrated Egyptian-Syrian union, he had to accept secession without using force, not because there was a sense of community, but on the contrary, because there was a less integrated community--in contradiction to Deutsch's definition. On the national level, Deutsch's theory reflects a stable democratic system, and is limited to such a condition.

The above analysis shows that the writers' criticisms of Deutsch's definition are unjustified, though they help to stress some important aspects of the problem of integration and should be regarded as complementary. In this writer's opinion, integration is a dynamic process and it takes place on the national and international levels, but a wholly integrated community representing the Parsonian model with respect to the goal attainment, adaptation (economy), pattern maintenance, and integration (culture) is ideal but not real. This far from ideal situation makes integration a real problem that needs to be studied in all interrelated areas. For this reason, Deutsch's definition was broad and flexible enough to include the basic factors necessary for integration, whether societal, institutional or political.

II - APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INTEGRATION

A. H. Birch has attempted to classify the approaches to the study of integration into four groupings or categories: institutional, socio-¹³logical, federalism as a process and federalism as a bargain.

It should be noted that the term 'federalism' is used in Birch's article not only on the national level, but also in the study of integration on the international level, as in the 'federations' of Nigeria and Malaysia, and the attempt to create a federation of East Africa.

The Institutional Approach

Birch used the term 'institutional approach' to identify the legalistic one. This type of study aimed at constructing a model by isolating the common features of governmental systems. These features are defined first in terms of constitutional law, and then in terms of the political relationships, which had developed on the basis of the constitutional provisions. According to Birch this approach should be¹⁴ disciplined by a framework of constitutional law.

The shortcoming of this institutional approach lies in the fact that the historical development of federal systems has enabled the legally-minded to encompass them with particular definitions which may not be compatible with the political developments as manifested in the supra-national systems on the international level and cooperative federalism on the national level. As a result this constitutional approach cannot usefully be applied to many of the federations that have been established since the war. It has become very difficult to figure out the type of

legal system of a modern intergovernmental agency and to determine whether it is confederal, federal, or supranational according to classical definitions.

According to the study made by Max Beloff, the three European communities tried to make up for the relative weakness of the federal or supranational element by introducing a confederal one in the shape of ministerial councils.¹⁵ Such an institution reflects political objectives and does not identify with the abstract legal model which is the outcome of the legal approach.

What is significant in the legal study of institutions with respect to integration on the international level, however, is to answer the question: Which legal institution is more stable? The historical and comparative data presented by Deutsch and his associates supports the hypothesis that the pluralistic community is more stable than the amalgamated one. Of eight unions that failed, only one was pluralistic, while seven were amalgamated.¹⁶

This writer is inclined to believe in the correctness of Deutsch's conclusion because integration is not all rewards. In fact, there is always a price to pay for the expected rewards--a topic which will be discussed later on. As a result of integration, changes are apt to take place affecting almost all aspects of society, whether political, economic, social or administrative. These changes may generate disintegrative forces whose interests are affected by the process of unification. For this reason it is quite clear that the amalgamated form is apt to provoke more dissent than the pluralistic one. Moreover, the former's legal system does not allow much room for adjustments, and as a result it is more likely that it will either fail or use force to sustain integration.

Supranationalism, which takes the form of functional intergovernmental agencies, is in between the two extremes of the amalgamated and the pluralistic community. In the words of Walter Hallstein, the E.E.C. is "not fully either a federation or a confederation...it is nevertheless very different...It certainly has federal elements...involves what Prime Minister Harold Macmillan has aptly termed the pooling of sovereignty,¹⁷ and already represents partial union."

For this reason the price to be paid, and the dissent provoked are less than in the case of the amalgamated community but more than in that of the pluralistic community. Success or failure, progress or regression depends on political factors. It is true that De Gaulle in 1965 and 1966 "gave his partners the choice between no common market and a common market¹⁸ without supranational powers" but the fact remains that, if there was no spill over, there was also no spill back, and there may be a spill over again when a different political outlook develops. Conversely, the amalgamated union is likely to undergo secession or forced compliance.

The Sociological Approach

The shortcoming of the legal approach was disclosed by the sociological school. Livingston wrote that the essence of federalism lies, not in the institutional or constitutional structure, but in the society itself. The nature of the political society can be examined only by observing how the institutions work in the context of that society. The social diversities that produce federalism may be of many kinds, differences of economic interest, religion, race, nationality, language, variations in size, separation by great distances, differences in historical¹⁹ background.

The question is to determine which conditions are necessary for integration. In this respect, the problems of definitions, their interrelations and classification exist. For example, Etzioni considered as 'social properties' the threat of a common enemy, the uniting of a sub-area e.g. the Benelux countries to countervail an overwhelming partner--²⁰ West Germany and France in the E.E.C. It might lead to a better classification if we considered these conditions as mere political factors.

Etzioni held that homogeneity in ethnic origin, cultural tradition, language and religion were once deemed essential for a stable political community. Yet in another place he came to the conclusion that sharing culture is not required for unification, nor does the lack²¹ of a shared culture prevent it. In the writer's opinion, it is not the cultural values in themselves which affect integration or disintegration, but their utilization as political tools. Because of the problem of definitions, their usages and interrelations, it may be more logical and simple to begin with the more general terms, and then proceed to the more specific ones.

1. 'Values'--Deutsch used the term values to mean a 'distinctive way of life' which he considered a minor value. He also used the term major²² value to mean a 'basic political ideology'.

Philip Jacob wrote that "...the most important distinction from the standpoint of research on homogeneity is the distinction between values as goals, or preferred events, and values as normative criteria²³ of action representing feelings of obligation, legitimacy and the like."

These definitions of values were selected because each one of them

represents a certain category. The 'distinctive way of life' is more or less inherent in society, the value as a goal is a more conscious attitude towards the future, and the norm, broadly speaking, represents the "superstructure over all social behavior" to use Werner Levi's
 24
 phrase.

A distinctive way of life--a minor value--is the outcome of several factors, such as ethnic origin, culture, language, religion, tradition, economic standard, and ecological factors. It is assumed that common values constitute a community building factor. They contribute to integration "not because of their substance, but because they are something
 25
 shared."

To evaluate the effect of values, with respect to integration, it is necessary to discuss whether values are a driving force in themselves, or a rationalization for political interests. If values and norms are of secondary importance, then the problem of integration should be studied in the political realm.

Werner Levi's perception is that though men have attempted to humanize their relations, the evidence is overwhelming that most statesmen, in making their decisions, have asked first, what needed to be done to preserve the interests of the country, and only second, if ever, what
 26
 the moral thing might be to do. At best, statesmen find it necessary to rationalize their decisions and justify their acts in terms of values. In other words, "the true nature of the policy is concealed by ideological
 27
 justifications and rationalizations" to use Morgenthau's phrase.

In fact, the problem has been oversimplified. The principle of self determination of the German minority in Czechoslovakia, leading to the unity and integration of the Germans, could be a rationalization of

the expansive drives inherent in the Nazi regime, but it could also be a value having a driving force in itself to initiate political action. The one does not negate the other.

The priority of politics and interests over societal values such as race and culture is very obscure even in the cases where the non-ethical character of a dictatorial, expansionist regime is apparent. The obscurity derives from the fact that societal values are not a mere facade.

Assuming the correctness of Morgenthau's and Levi's ideas, then societal homogeneity would not be the driving force in integration. It would be no more than a tool used, and the analysis should be sought in the political realm instead. The comparative study made by Etzioni showed that "cultural homogeneity is neither a prerequisite to unification nor a sufficient condition..."²⁸ The cases of Switzerland, Canada, and Belgium have proved this conclusion. Historical data gives evidence supporting Haas's statement, "...the mere fact that specific regions were unified politically and culturally at one time seems not to prevent them from subsequently dividing into warring nations denying in their conduct the²⁹ cultural unity the historian wishes to impute to them".

In conclusion, comparative study and historical data prove that societal factors are of secondary importance. This may be supported theoretically if we accept Morgenthau's and Levi's opinion about the role of values as mere justifications for politics.

2. Ideology--An important question relevant to integration, is whether the societal factors can initiate the process of integration or whether there has to be a political stimulus.

Criticizing Deutsch, Birch wrote, "...these conditions include a

distinctive way of life, expectation of economic gains, and unbroken links of social communication. But what is conspicuously absent from the list is any mention of the political circumstances in which the politicians who alone can create an amalgamated security community are likely to do so. Without this the list is potentially misleading, to
30
put it no higher."

The previous point of view is a short cut answer to the role of politics and social conditions with respect to integration. In fact there is an interrelation between the two factors. The point of convergence is where new minor values attempt to enter politics and transcend the boundaries of sociology. At this stage, a major value, i.e. a main political ideology comes into being. But as soon as the political ideology comes into power, it aspires to become incorporated into the belief system of individuals, and thus enters the societal field again. It goes without saying that in a totalitarian state "the task of government is to reconstruct society utterly according to the goals of an
31
ideology."

The above model is a simplified and idealized cyclical process, but in reality it is not as simple as that. The political ideology does not cease to be political when it is incorporated in the belief system of individuals, it is simply that the societal aspect prevails when the political struggle for power has cooled down. Moreover, this cycle is not by any means deterministic.

It is necessary to point out that the homogeneity of political ideology gives more power to the process of integration than the homogeneity in societal and minor values. The difference between minor and major values is not a matter of degree as Deutsch implicitly suggests--

the same attitude expressed by Etzioni when he differentiated between the period of 'initiation' and the period of 'take off' when the unification process has accumulated 'enough momentum' to continue on its own. 32

It is not only a quantitative change, as these authors suggest, there is also a change in the nature of the value. The emancipation of women and workers depends in the beginning on sociological, humanitarian and utopian, minor values, but later on the element of 'legitimacy' is imputed to these values, by the introduction of the ideology of a democratic welfare state or socialism. This element of 'legitimacy' provided by the political ideology gives power to the societal ideas, affects the process of integration and gives it momentum.

The question to be discussed is whether the political ideology is an integrative force, and under what conditions it helps the process of integration.

It is assumed that homogeneity of societal and political values is a condition for integration. Conversely, it is self-evident that integration cannot take place between two countries with opposing ideologies such as a democratic country and a socialist country. In the writer's opinion this is the main reason which blocks the reunification of Germany, not the fear that united Germany would regain power, dominate the Continent 33 once more or Adenauer's policy of Western European integration. An opposing dominant ideology has either to be accepted by a policy of peaceful coexistence or to be fought. Integration between two units with opposing ideologies is unthinkable. However, the degree of cultural or commercial transactions may progress as a result of the policy of peaceful coexistence, which in fact implies no ideological tolerance.

On the other hand, the ideology, whether compatible with or opposing

the other ideologies, enjoys the capability of cutting across national boundaries. Communism has an international appeal though it has recently been challenged by national communism. Kelman wrote that in the Communist world nationalism led to separate and often conflicting policies in different countries, thus helping to break down the myth of a monolithic world communism.

34

The political ideology which is able to cut across national boundaries must stand "for something new", to use Deutsch's terms. Assuming the validity of this statement, one must nevertheless make some reservations. It is true that an ideology standing for the status quo does not stimulate the process of integration, but the question is how far the change effected by the 'new ideology' should go in order to further integration. A revolutionary ideology would inevitably provoke hostility as well as support. In other words, the political struggle on the national level is extended onto the international level, and this may handicap the process of integration. A typical example of this is the stagnant condition of the Arab Union under the ideology of the 'status quo' represented by the Arab League, and also for the failure of the 'revolutionary' regimes to stimulate the integrative process.

35

A second reservation may be made. What matters is not how extreme or moderate the ideology may be, but that it should reflect the needs of social change in all the integrating countries. If the levels of social change are different, the political ideology may be compatible to the needs of one country and incompatible to those of the other. Such an ideology would be a disintegrative force. At best, it would be progressive in one country and utopian in the other. It is likely that coercion will be used to enforce its 'messianic' mission.

The third reservation is that the political ideology would serve as a basis for formulating the new values in terms of goals. If this ideology was the driving force behind the process of integration, a change in policy would be a violation to the understanding, on the basis of which the component units agreed to enter the federation. On the other hand, it may prove to be rigid and inflexible, and unable to make the necessary changes if it adheres to the policy agreed upon when integration first took place. This problem is well known in the case of federations made on the national level, but the analogy still holds on the international level. Once a union has been established, it is not possible to delimit the sovereignty of the state and prohibit it from changing the basic values which formed the foundation of integration, especially that these values, like constitutional provisions, are not clearly articulated. The conclusion is that an 'early' change in the basic values is likely to be a disintegrative factor.

Assuming that a political ideology cutting across boundaries would provoke opposition as well as support, the question is what kind of methods are used to cope with this problem? It is clear that the launching of an ideological war is one alternative, but it is likely to end with an internal revolution or a war. The former would help to pave the way for integration, but it may develop its own national course. The latter is a return to the policy of invasion and domination, though the ideology and the slogan of liberation may be used as a facade, and the war may take the form of infiltration. In both cases it is a matter of sheer power and force which determines the outcome. Nevertheless this is apt to provoke a nationalistic reaction and the accusation of 'colonialism' is raised against the 'liberators' or the proponents of unity.

In the realm of politics, the methods used to further integration, with respect to the role of political ideology are as follows:

The first method is to 'depoliticize' the conflicting values. Almost any value, whether religious or cultural, could be effective politically, but this would depend on several conditions:

a. that these values are 'institutionalized' or structured. The presence of active institutions would provide the ideology with the power necessary for backing these values.

b. that these values are held by the relevant strata of the political units, not merely as personal beliefs, but that these units "should develop a missionary attitude toward them"³⁷ to use Deutsch's phrase.

Naturally mobility or recruitment from the social institution to the political strata is an indicator of this condition.

For this reason, integration can only proceed if a successful attempt is made to depoliticize the opposing values and to politicize the homogeneous values. Historically, the gradual depoliticization of the religious values with the development of secular states was a precondition for integration. Depoliticization is a matter of degree. So long as identification with the community is more dominant, than identification with subgroups, then integration is possible. In all cases, similarities exist alongside with dissimilarities. Rupert Emerson wrote "The notion of single national culture, shaping the community and embracing all its people is an admirable one, whose principal shortcoming is its remoteness from historical fact."³⁸

The second method to cope with the problem of conflicting ideologies is to make compromises. Historically, conservatives such as Bismark knew how to incorporate part of the liberal program into their own politics.

In the U.S., far reaching concessions to radical desires in the state constitutions came to be balanced by the greater conservatism of the federal constitution, this in turn came to be compensated for in part by the far more radical principles of the first ten amendments to that constitution known as the Bill of Rights.

39

The third method is to find a common basis or a principle able to embrace the conflicting ideologies. For example, so long as conservatives and liberals support the democratic-constitutional framework and operate within it, it is likely that conflicting ideologies would not greatly handicap the process of integration. It should be noted that this method does not suppress the ideological conflict. It simply means an agreement on the rules of the game. In other words, the process of integration would build up a new 'arena' on an international level where the conflict would take place alongside the national level.

Though these methods are classified theoretically as different and distinct, in reality they are more or less complementary to each other. Depoliticization of issues would help in making compromises and establishing the rules of the game, upgrading common interests and vice-versa.

It should also be noted that these methods are more acceptable in a pluralistic democratic system than in a system giving much weight to ideological commitments or based on a charismatic type of leadership. Though Henry Kissinger was dealing with the problem of the ideological type of leadership and its effect on foreign policy, the generalization he made is applicable to this topic. He wrote, "...Concessions are possible, but they are made to reality--not to individuals or to a bargaining process.. Diplomacy becomes difficult when one of the parties considers the key element to negotiation--the give and take of the

process of bargaining--as but a superstructure for factors not part of the negotiation itself." ⁴⁰ This writer is inclined to apply the same idea to the "charismatic revolutionary type of leadership", to use Kissinger's phrase.

The above mentioned methods were used to promote the integration of Europe, which constituted the ideal type of system for their application. The proponents of European unity leaned heavily on the method of depoliticizing the ideological issues. As previously mentioned, Monnet wrote that the large market does not "prejudge the future economic systems ⁴¹ of Europe". For him, European unity is not a "theory" but a process. A. C. Day stressed the same idea that membership of the community in no sense implies that the members are committed to a laissez-faire free ⁴² enterprise economy.

The functionalist approach, progressing from E.C.S.C. to the E.E.C. and EURATOM, stressed also the economic side, and thus de-emphasized the political implications of the uniting of Europe. The method of depoliticization was pushed to the extreme, as Monnet thought that the proper management of the economic integrated sectors by a non-national, detached 'technocratic' body of Europeans would inevitably lead to full federation ⁴³ by confronting governments with inescapable economic faits accomplis.

It goes without saying that depoliticization could not evade ideological conflicts. After all, Europe's economy is based mainly on the free enterprise principle, accompanied with government enterprises. The parties leading the process of integration were not socialist parties. For these reasons, 'depoliticization' had to be complemented by ideological concessions.

The main ideological issue which had to undergo concessions was the

free enterprise principle. Planning, dirigism, and the distribution of wealth were the new slogans propagated in the conservative circles as compromises. But 'planning' is an ambiguous word. Its range extends from right to left.

The ideology of the association of Christian Democratic parties (N.E.I.) is represented in a resolution adopted in 1954: "In the social realm, the equitable distribution of productive wealth, implying the growing access to property of all...The Congress recalls that N.E.I. demands economic integration and wishes soon to promote the freeing of trade, the harmonization of economic, financial and social policies."⁴⁴

As for planning vs. free competition the neo-liberals thought that the integration of Europe is a desirable step for maximizing the natural geographic advantages of certain industries and thus 'rationalizing' patterns of distribution, but other 'Europeans' maintained that full federation alone can assure democratic planning, since the only real choices are between planning and stagnation.⁴⁵

The ideology of the E.C.S.C. High Authority with respect to planning as expressed by Rene Mayer is that regulation of competition must be tolerated only to introduce free trade without serious hardship to workers and marginal firms, to protect employment and to control cartels and discrimination.⁴⁶

The compromises were confined to the following ideas: The first is the equitable distribution of productive wealth, which stands for a reformist policy. The second is harmonization of policies. The third is to confine the interventionist policy in view of preventing serious hardship to workers, and controlling cartels. A reliance on technology and technocrats to develop the welfare state in the age of abundance

constitutes the overtone of the statements. Reform is thus the compromise introduced by the integrationists. The policy of compromise was adopted in practice as well as in theory. Dealing with the O.K.U. a France-Saar-German coal cartel, the High Authority refused the request for authorization of the arrangement, but decreed its reorganization, making it a voluntary union of coal wholesalers.

47

The integrationists were conscious that depoliticization and compromises were not enough to eliminate ideological conflict, so it was necessary to prevent the isolation of the opposition. The integration would proceed if the European institutions were considered by all to be the framework within which they would operate to promote their policies.

Monnet stressed the idea that European institutions do not prejudice the future policy, thus making room for changes through cooperation. Haas wrote that United Europe seems to be an adaptable symbol: individuals of Conservative, Liberal and Socialist leanings have no difficulty in embracing it. Political parties in all countries contain adherents as well as opponents of the symbol. The outcome is that such institutions became an 'arena' where the ideological struggle continued to take place on a European level. For example, the Socialist Group in the Common Assembly exerted pressure so that the High Authority would exert specific powers over wages and working conditions, and collective bargaining in spite of the fact that these powers were not given to it by the Treaty of E.C.S.C.

48

On the other hand, Ludwig Erhard stated that the Schuman Plan had two implications, one of which incorporated the principles of supranational dirigism, and also the preparation for free competition. "We in Germany will certainly attempt to send people to the Schuman Plan Organization

who will stress the spirit of freedom."

These two examples were cited to illustrate that the adaptability of the E.C.S.C. made it possible for opposing ideologies to operate within its framework and thus promote the process of integration.

Deutsch studied the "Interrelationship Between Internal and External
50
Components in 16 Foreign Policy Issues in 1952-1958". On analysing this study it is possible to draw the following conclusions:

1. The Socialist Democratic Party (S.P.D.) was strongly opposed to the E.C.S.C., and the E.D.C. and Paris Agreements, but later on was mostly favorable to the E.E.C. and very favorable to the Euratom Treaty.
2. The Trade Unions were divided about the E.C.S.C., strongly opposed the E.D.C. and Paris Agreements, but later on were mostly favorable to the E.E.C. and very favorable to the Euratom Treaty.
3. Big Business was divided about the E.C.S.C., mildly opposed to the E.D.C., then became mostly favorable to Paris Agreements and E.E.C., and then very favorable to the Euratom.
4. The Christian Democratic Party (C.D.U.) was very favorable to all issues.

The analysis shows that the Socialists and Trade Unions who in the beginning opposed the European institutions, accepted them later on, and so the idea of 'United Europe' became the framework in which the conflicting ideologies and forces operated. Also, the ideological diversity or fragmentation took place at a later stage in West Germany, since the S.P.D. as well as C.D.U. endorsed the European Community.

To evaluate such methods, it is possible to conclude that the European movement of integration was able to contain different forces so that they would operate within its framework.

On the other hand, the excessive depoliticization of the functionalist approach makes Europeanism too unstructured and too permissive in terms of concrete steps to deserve the label of ideology. To use Haas's phrase, the European idea is empty, it has neither the transcendence of
51
Messianic ideologies nor the immanence of concrete patriotism.

A poll made in West Germany in 1956 to find out the extent of popular support for political integration showed that 75% were in favor of the United States of Europe. But the percentage fell drastically to
52
43% in favor of close political cooperation with England and France. When West Germans were asked in 1955 whether they would vote for the United States of Europe, 68% answered 'Yes', and when they were asked whether a European Parliament should have the last word on important questions that also concerned Germany, the figure fell drastically to
53
33%.

The conclusion drawn is that there is a wide gap between the idea of unity, and people's perception of its forms. What matters more is their consciousness and knowledge of the price to be paid for integration in terms of economic and social effects. Otherwise the idea of unity is a loose one, and not solid enough to stand the repercussions of changing political interests, and the rise of nationalism.

The sociological approach has been criticised for two reasons:

1. It does not pay much attention to the political conditions in which the politicians, who alone can create an amalgamated security-community are likely to do so. As previously mentioned, Birch criticised Deutsch on these grounds. Though the criticism is correct, it should not be directed against Deutsch, as he did not overlook the role of the political factors for integration.

2. In fact Deutsch and Etzioni began their comparative studies with a large variety of different situations. The findings were not promising with regard to building up a theory. Any conclusion drawn from the study of a particular case would not apply to any other case.

Economic industrial homogeneity helped the integration of the E.E.C. Complementary, industrial and agriculture economy helped the integration of the Commonwealth.

Homogeneity in per capita income helped the integration of the L.A.F.T.A., as the countries all fall in the same general category when compared on an absolute scale. A relative scale, using a member country as a measure, as in the comparison between Peru and Uruguay, would show that heterogeneity would not hamper them from developing effective union. 54

Homogeneity exists side by side with heterogeneity. It depends on the perspective of the student, and the scale he uses. The absolute scale would provide the researcher with homogeneous conditions, the relative one would produce heterogeneous results. There are significant 'islands' of almost identical environmental factors among countries of Western Europe. These islands vary according to the social structure, the economic and industrial development and the ideologocial patterns. 55 Moreover, the locations of these islands change according to the measure used by the researcher.

It is not our purpose to study the theoretical problems of theory-building, but a comparative study such as that done by Deutsch and Etzioni is necessarily an applied study and more related to reality. It cannot deal with limited variables in an idealized situation, because it deals with composite reality. When one deals with several variables, it is difficult to evaluate their relative importance, but it permits one to

avoid oversimplification. This might be the reason which made Etzioni present his study of political unification as a paradigm, which is less than a theory but more than a perspective.

Integration (Federalism) as a Process

The shortcomings of the sociological approach, and the failure to achieve a theory of integration constitute the reasons for dealing with the problem as a process. According to Birch "...Federalism is said to be the process of federalizing, that is the process of achieving a union of groups which retain their identity."⁵⁷

Since the social and economic forces are the same whether they contribute to disintegration i.e. nation-building or to the integration of international organizations, scholars have attempted to approach the subject from a different angle, viz. its process and dynamics. The theoretical criticism to this approach is that there may be difficulty in deciding whether certain political systems are to be regarded as federal at any particular time.⁵⁸ To avoid this criticism, Haas defined a political community as a condition in which specific groups show more loyalty to their central political institutions "in a specific period of time".⁵⁹

The problem of nationalism and community formation as an integrative and disintegrative factor was the reason for his confining his definition to a specific period of time and thus avoiding the process approach. Deutsch and his associates tried to avoid the "easy use" of some force of nationalism as a supposed cause of the political union or separation or of the integration or disintegration that followed, because nationalism was the result and not the cause. In fact, nationalism can work as an integrative

force when it transcends feudal boundaries and tribal schisms. It can also be a disintegrative factor and transform the empire into nations. Failing to see or to own this natural contradiction made these scholars attempt to ignore either the case (Deutsch), or to specify the period of time to avoid the study of the process.

In the writer's opinion, any study of the problem of integration cannot avoid either the sociological approach, or its dynamics. Though Haas confined himself to a certain condition of integration in a specific period of time, this was limited to his definition, for he studied integration as a process as well. Etzioni studied "the dialectics of supranational unification", but he did not build up an abstract model, highly formalized, with all empirical concepts removed, in the sense meant by Ernest Nagel.⁶⁰

The most important questions posed by integration as a process were the studies of the functionalist method, its spill over problem, and the dialectics of integration.

Historically, the 'functionalist' school of technocrats was led by Jean Monnet, the architect of France's postwar economic planning structure. The theory he advocated rests on the assumption of the 'expansive logic' of functional integration.⁶¹

The theory was transmitted from the politicians to the scholars and the expansive logic was given the title of 'spill over'. Haas pointed out that integration in one sector tends to spill over into other sectors, i.e. tends to trigger integration in them as well. His study of the E.C.S.C. shows how it spilled over in Euratom and the E.E.C. The studies of Haas and Etzioni tended also to suggest that societal sectors differ in their spill over function.⁶² This logic also means that the superiority of step-by-step economic decisions over crucial political choices is assumed as permanent, and the 'determinism implicit' in the picture of

the European social and economic structure is almost absolute, to use
⁶³
 Haas's phrase. Therefore, the functionalist theory is based on two
 notions:

The first is the relative importance of sectors, which have more
 or less spill over value. These were ordered by Etzioni with respect to
 their spill over tendencies--from low to high--as follows:

1. organizations that deal with services such as postal services
2. organizations dealing with labor, health, cultural exchange
3. tariff agreements and military organizations
- ⁶⁴
4. economic unions or common markets.

The second notion is that the expansive logic implies a certain
 sort of determinism, and for this reason the main effort should be one
⁶⁵
 of initiation.

Etzioni held that the economic sector has the highest spill over
⁶⁶
 value, and he interpreted Haas as supporting the same view.

In fact, Haas's point of view was ambiguous, and as a result of this
 ambiguity, Etzioni's comment was not absolutely correct. Haas wrote that
 to say that the field of economics contributed most to the process of
 integration in Europe is a "superficial" answer. Not merely economic
 tasks, therefore, but the degree of functional specificity of the economic
 task is causally related to the intensity of integration, but functional
 specificity may be so trivial as to remain outside the stream of human
⁶⁷
 expectations. In this writer's opinion, there are many factors which
 should be taken into consideration:

The first one is that the economic sector is by its nature more
 depoliticized, a topic previously discussed as a method for eliminating
 conflicting ideologies. Etzioni held that the economic union is a much

less ambitious goal than military or political unification. It does not require tackling the very institutional, and ideological core of the nation state. Even if it eventually leads to wide unification, it allows the illusion of sovereignty to be maintained unharmed.⁶⁸

The Treaty of Rome, establishing the Common Market, was very cautious about dealing with the sovereignty of the states. Article 2 did not go beyond promoting "closer relations between its members". In the preamble, "the signatory governments determined to establish the foundations of an ever closer union."⁶⁹ The objective was to emphasize the economic aspect of the treaty, and thus avoid political problems. This gives the economic sector spill over value, according to the functionalist approach.

The second point is that economic integration affects all societal groups, consumers, producers, management, labor, farmers, small business, and therefore tends to have extensive political repercussions. But it should also be noted that the pure economic interests are more or less fragmented. If the coal producers in Germany were doubtful about E.C.S.C. supranational powers and the tendency to reduce coal prices, the consuming industry (especially the steel industry in France) was not. This fragmentation inherent in the economic sector gives it the highest spill over value.

The third point is that the excessive specificity of the economic sector would make it insignificant politically with respect to human expectations. On the other hand, if the specificity is planned to be a gradual process, this would make possible the necessary adjustments, because of the social and economic effects of integration. This gradualist approach would give the economic sector its spill over value.

The fourth point is that the objectives and expectations in the functionalist approach are by their nature not very high, so there is a

balance between them and probabilities or possibilities. Functionalism has the privilege of being realistic and thus avoids the frustration resulting from the creation of a wide gap between expectation and fulfillment. On the other hand it lacks political appeal and a messianic mission.

To sum up these findings, the economic sector spill over is high because it is depoliticized; nevertheless, it may have political repercussions, but these are mitigated because pure economic interests are usually fragmented. Moreover, the specificity of the economic sector may be helpful as long as it is a planned gradualist approach to allow adjustments and keep in sight the political ends.

The expansive logic of the functionalist theory implies a sort of determinism. The functional logic leads from national frustration to economic unity and eventually to political unification, to use Haas's
70
phrase. It led from the E.C.S.C. to the Common Market. This type of determinism works also within the limited borderlines of the specific economic sector. The lifting of the trade barriers for steel and coal in six European countries under E.C.S.C. created a need to remove preferences (which national railroads gave to coal and steel industries of their own countries) in order to avoid indirect discrimination against imported products.

Etzioni expressed this type of determinism by saying that when the unification of a high spill over sector has occurred and unification of other related sectors is blocked, an unbalanced state is created which generates pressures to solve the imbalance. One has either to progress
71
to more encompassing unification or to retreat to a narrower one.

It is doubtful whether Etzioni's study of the dialectics of supra-national unification meant to build up a highly formalized model, but in

any case his perception of the process of unification was nothing more than an application of the laws of dialectics. The internal contradiction i.e. thesis and antithesis was given the title of rivalry. The synthesis i.e. unification is the outcome of this contradiction or rivalry. The unification process takes the form of a spiral, from sub-groups to super system, and from super system to super-super-system.

The dialectical law which says that quantitative changes result in qualitative change was also applied by differentiating between the period of initiation and the occurrence of take off, when the integrative power acquires enough momentum to take off, but the expression of 'dialectics' was omitted, and Etzioni mentioned that the concept of take off was used
72
by students of aerodynamics.

As for Deutsch, the concept of take off is not only an accumulation of momentum, which is a quantitative change, but it is also a qualitative change. For him, the proposal of integration is a matter of theory, but
73
after the take off the theory becomes a political force. The qualitative change in Deutsch's idea is not only a matter of motion; there is also a change from theory to politics, but Etzioni stresses more--and abstractly--the qualitative change in the process itself, without emphasizing the political aspect.

Etzioni not only applied the philosophical laws of dialectics, he also perceived the process of unification as an historical one--perhaps by analogy to historical materialism--developing from states to federations, from federations to supranational unions, and from these to super-systems. So the functionalist theory and its expansive logic implied an historical determinism, but it was based on subjective imagination, and perhaps even wishful thinking. In any case the practice of the European

unification revealed the shortcoming of this approach, due mainly to political reasons.

It may be necessary to evaluate the previous approach i.e. 'integration as a process' before proceeding to discuss the political approach, especially as the criticisms of the sociological approach and the dialectics of integration pave the way to an understanding of the political approach. The criticism may be summed up as follows:

1. Functionalism based on economic agreements need not involve any spill over. Converging functional interests often tend to be transitory, and hence functional associations may be simply marriages of convenience. Hallstein urged that Germans should not support E.C.S.C. because it would be a tactical device to gain freedom for Germany from the fetters from which they suffer or because it may be profitable in terms of dividends, but only because it is one of those efforts through which mankind can
74 progress. Nevertheless, last minute assurances of the immediate disappearance of allied controls over German industry was necessary for the ratification of the E.C.S.C. in the Bundestag. The opposite hypothesis to the functional logic might predict 'role differentiation', i.e. that agreements may be entered into even in the face of sharp differences, which simultaneously impede agreements but in other areas. According to this hypothesis, agreements are not indications of integration since they are limited to certain areas without the capacity to spill over in other areas.
2. The deterministic implication of the expansive logic was criticised by Etzioni, who said that "to suggest that extensive economic unification requires political unification and hence that the two go hand in hand, is to fall into the functionalistic trap which assumes that what is needed
75 will be." In respect of this criticism, one might recall his early

writings about the dialectics of supranational unification which implied a sort of determinism, as previously mentioned. Deutsch and his associates deny that there is any clear cut automatic trend towards internationalism.

Their findings make it doubtful that the growth of a state resembles a snowballing process. A study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs cites the opinion of some observers that it may be optimistic to think that N.A.T.O. will learn to do one job by doing another.⁷⁷

3. It was previously assumed that functional integration in the economic sector has a high spill over value because it does not tackle the very core of the nation state. Broadly speaking, it is not the functional approach or the services rendered by an international agency that matter. What stands before the eyes of all are the immense political conflicts that divide the great nations of the earth. This is not primarily a matter of false emphasis born of ignorance. It is rather the recognition of the undeniable fact that from a functional point of view, what the national government does or does not do is much more important for the satisfaction of the individual wants than what an international functional agency does or does not do.⁷⁸

The more specific the function is the more it loses its potential power for integration. It may also take the wind from the sails of the movements for full-scale amalgamation by making the few already amalgamated functions serve adequately the main needs which had supplied most of the driving power for the over-all amalgamation movements. This psychological implication is quite realistic as the satisfaction of the needs may stop the process unless there are other converging needs. The historical evidence proves that the functional Zollverein promoted the integration of Germany, but it was not successful in the Italian states, and amalgamation

was achieved without its aid, but on political grounds.

4. Haas, in the preface for the new edition of "The Uniting of Europe", written in 1968, rejected the functionalist theory which he had previously propounded. He wrote, "the determinism implicit in the picture of the European social and economic structure is almost absolute. Given all these conditions we said, the progression from a politically inspired common market to an economic union and finally to a political union among states is automatic...De Gaulle has proved us wrong."⁷⁹

The main criticism of the functionalist theory is that it neglected the new aspirations and expectations that develop after the initial experience, such as the emergence of a charismatic leadership able to assert the revival of nationalism as against supranationalism. Functionalism is by its nature depoliticized, and based on pragmatic interests, but these, because they are pragmatic, and not reinforced with ideological or philosophical commitment, are ephemeral. Just because they are weakly held they can be readily scrapped. In other words, depoliticization, which was considered as an advantage of functionalism, has become a disadvantage. Political pragmatism and economic incrementalism are their own worst enemies, and they are subject to reversal by their nature. Moreover, the success of economic integration can be a cause of political disagreement.⁸⁰

The study of the Common Market shows that it was unable to define a comprehensive commercial policy toward third countries because of wide divergencies in economic interests. Where a common political ideology was supposed to exist and strengthen the Western attitude toward the Communist world, it was undermined by economic competition. When the Fiat company concluded a contract with the Soviets to set up a plant in the U.S.S.R., it had to share its gains with the U.S.A. by extending sub-contracts to

American plants. This in turn compelled the U.S. to lift export restrictions on more than 400 non-strategic items as a result of commercial competition, regardless of integration commitment. To overcome commercial competition and the lack of defining a comprehensive policy, the Council of Ministers decided that there would be consultations between the member states prior to trade negotiations with the Communist bloc. Bilateral agreements with the Communist bloc would be made, but only for one year, in order to examine their adaptation to emerging E.E.C. common policies.⁸¹

The previous arguments lead to the inevitable conclusion that they are contradictory and confusing. This is due not only to the differences between writers but also to their confusion. Hoffmann writes that "whoever would apply Ernst Haas's methods to the Atlantic Community would waste his time". Haas rejects his theory of the functional and expansive logic. Etzioni writes about the dialectics of integration with its deterministic implication, but later rejects it.

There are several reasons for this confusion, which may be summed up as follows:

1. At the time when the movement for the uniting of Europe was in its flowering, and Monnet's methods were adopted, the early writings of the political scientists reflected this movement, and established the functionalist theory. Later on, when the movement suffered a setback, because of the nationalistic policy adopted by De Gaulle, the opposing arguments emphasizing the political approach were propounded, sometimes by the very same writers. This gives the impression that the theorizing was limited to the explanatory descriptive realm at best, and did not present more than propositions.
2. It is not correct to judge any theory or method in absolute terms;

it should be seen in its context. The functionalist theory was the only 'political' solution to overcome the political difficulties. The record of failure of the European integration stretched from the creation of the far-from-federal Council of Europe through the defeat of the European Defense Community Treaty to the burial of the European Political Community project in 1954. The reasons for the failure were political. As economic advantage proved to be an acceptable shared goal among the Six it was brought to the fore, while the political aim receded into the background. Integration through the economic sector was a political tactic to avoid confronting political handicaps. The 'halo' of the functionalist expansive logic was overrated in the theory and literature. 'Theorizing' changed it from a political tactic into a predictive theory with deterministic laws. This is what caused disillusion and the inevitable revision of the 'theory' which in the writer's opinion was no more than a tactical device determined by specific circumstances.

3. Thinking in absolute terms cannot lead either to an explanatory or predictive theory. Instead, the result is apt to be controversy. All systems show forms of cooperation as well as forms of conflict. There is rivalry and discord in the European agricultural policy, but at the same time there is cooperation directed against third parties. The French Wheat replaces the American wheat on the German market. It is thus necessary to see both the successes and the failures of the functionalist theory in order to achieve consistency of thought and put an end to contradictory arguments and confusion.

4. The functionalist tactic kept up the momentum of the European movement, by upgrading common interests and splitting differences, but its aspiration that technocrats would lead and promote the European integration in political

terms was not realized. To be more concrete, it was the failure of those writers who defined this tactic as a theory and overrated its implications. There was no evidence that the technocrats aspired to achieve political aims through economic intergovernmental agencies. Monnet resigned from the E.C.S.C. in order to promote the European political movement. Nevertheless the functionalist method has its theoretical value as an indicator to political integration.

The European integration movement has revealed the limitations of the functionalist approach. The dialectics of the expansive logic may lead either to progress or regression, according to Etzioni. The political approach--as we shall see later--holds that what was done could be undone (Hoffmann). But Haas concluded that if there is no spill over, there is no spill-back. In other words, all possibilities were covered, because the question was wrongly posed. Functionalism was posed as a theory whereas it was no more than a political tactic in order to keep up the momentum of Europeanism after the failures it underwent. The hasty reactions against functionalism could not completely deny its validity. It has its advantages and these should be used fully.

Integration as a Bargain: Political Approach

The limitations of the functionalist method, in terms of using the economic sector to generate pressures for political expansion, showed that integration is in fact a political process which has to be guided by politicians with the aim of achieving political interests. Ricker holds that federalism i.e. integration, is always the result of a political bargain which takes place in an historically unique situation.

According to Hoffmann, the European integration practice led to the

following findings. The first was the initiative of the politicians which launched the European integration movement. To put the spotlight on values and social structure may be necessary but to put it on the specialized political sector may well be sufficient. The second conclusion is that 'automaticity' of the spill over process must be rejected. What governments have done they can still undo. The functionalist model is entirely applicable when issues involved represent only a negligible fraction of the nation's resources over which all the participants have convergent interests, but it is not applicable when the functions involved are concerned with gross-politik. The third is that it is neither the common climate nor the common ideological and social structure that launched the integration movement; it is the interests involved in a unique situation such as the Communist threat, the post war frustration⁸² and weakness of Europe, and the need to solve the German problem.

Philippe C. Schmitter who participated with Haas in building up the functionalist method, recognized in a recent article the necessity for⁸³ treating politicization as an analytically distinct process.

The political approach means nothing more than using the integration movement to achieve political objectives. With respect to the political interests which trigger integration, we shall discuss the following items: a) external threat, b) external powers' interests, c) rewards and price of integration.

a) As regards the external threat it seems that the military or diplomatic threat is the most relevant condition, at least in Ricker's view. Deutsch⁸⁴ found that its effects were transitory. N.A.T.O. and E.D.C. were born of fear and frustration, to use Lester Pearson's phrase. Common values have not in the past always prevented the mutual slaughter of the peoples that

were divided into separate political units. What made Europe attempt to unite was a feeling of Soviet threat. In this writer's opinion there are some reservations to be taken into consideration:

1. The presence of a threat is not an objective fact only; it depends on the perceptions of the elites. A communist may not consider that there is a Soviet threat in the post World War II era. A Czechoslovak communist believing in 'socialism with a human face' considers the Soviet threat as an act of aggression. Political ideology plays an important role in defining a threat.

2. Since a military threat can be handled traditionally by military alliances, the writer is inclined to believe that military threat is unable by itself to trigger the integration process unless there are other sociological and ideological factors or an external power helping this process. These factors are not necessary for the future success of the union, as Etzioni holds, but the conclusion we draw here is that they must also be present when the unification is initiated.

3. Birch holds that the threat which triggers integration could be internal and not only external. This writer believes that in an age where limited wars and wars by proxy are launched, the distinction between internal and external threats becomes very thin. Thus the internal threat which motivates the need for integration is usually mingled with external threat.

b) As regards the external powers' interests, we find that their role in initiating the unification process is evident in most cases. The initiation of the O.E.E.C. was American, a condition for reciprocity of Marshall Plan Funds. It was Britain who initiated the West Indies Federa-

tion, which was made as a prerequisite for independence. The British initiated the federation of Malaysia, as they were worried about the internal insecurity of Singapore and wished to give the Borneo territories independence without leaving them in a vulnerable position in relation to Indonesia. It was Britain who encouraged the initiation of the Arab

87

League. The British government made the formation of the Nigerian Federation a prerequisite for independence in order to maintain the economic and administrative structure of the colonial era and preferably

88

in friendly hands.

These cases show that the external elite, to use Etzioni's term, determines the process of integration. It is used in some colonies as a prerequisite for independence to ensure the continuity of the ex-colonial administrative and economic and geographic structure as against tribalism. Birch writes that overseas investors tend to be more willing to invest in a large country (providing it appears to have a fair chance of political stability) than in a number of small countries. Moreover, tribal rivalries might be more easily contained in a federal union in which no tribe would comprise more than four to five percent of the

89

population.

With respect to the interests of external powers, the following conclusions may be drawn on the basis of the foregoing data:

1. Nationalism, based on tribal regionalism and a traditional system, does not offer a market for foreign investment.
2. Tribalism's rivalries, though contained, constitute a part of the balance of power in the newly independent state.
3. The internal balance of power is maintained through the manipulation of the institutional structure of the federation "to favor the weaker

islands over the more powerful in such matters as representation in both the federal government and the legislature." ⁹⁰ This causes future troubles and drains the resources of the federation.

4. The case of the Arab League shows that the speed of the fleet has to be the speed of the slowest ship. Since the Arab states were not on the same level in the independence movement, the abovesaid rule would necessarily impede this movement.

5. Through integration it is possible to ensure that power remains in 'friendly' hands after independence, as in the case of Malaysia.

It is self evident that an external power does not work in a vacuum and thus the final shape of integration is the outcome of political bargain, as Ricker holds.

It is true that the political approach is a realistic one, but the question is whether such integrations are successful or not. The answer lies in the internal structure of the union. So long as the external power reflects the needs of the integrating units, the possibilities of success are high. The U.S. aid to Europe converged with European needs, and so it triggered the process of unification--possibly more than the U.S. expected. The Six became not only partners of the U.S. but competitors as well. The West Indies Union failed as it did not reflect the internal power structure of the Union. The Nigerian federation remained as a result of coercion, which is not a sign of success or justice.

c) As regards the subject of the price and rewards of integration, we shall discuss the following points:

1. Loss of sovereignty: Integration means a loss of sovereignty, whether complete, as in the amalgamated community, or partial, as in a pluralistic

community with supranational powers. This loss of sovereignty is a disintegrative factor on the international level. In reality, it is possible to find different nationalities united in a common struggle to achieve independence and as soon as the sovereignty is obtained, the internal cohesion is lost. Would this fact refute the hypothesis that sovereignty is synonymous with absolute cohesion-within-a community and absolute disintegration-among-communities? Philip Jacob's answer seems to be positive, as it depends on the decrease of cohesion within the new countries of Asia and Africa.

91

Such an answer is correct theoretically within the idealized limitations set by the scholar, but the historical factor has been overlooked. Sovereignty in some cases was not originally synonymous with a cohesive nationality. In fact it was the outcome of an alliance between different nationalities which could be tribal. Each of these would later attempt either to inherit the colonial authority and coerce other nationalities, or to make a federative compromise, or to secede. This is not disintegration, as Jacobs holds, but rather a continuous integrative process seeking self-determination and independence from the colonial power and later from the other nationalities. Thus sovereignty is synonymous to ideal integration.

As integration implies the loss of sovereignty-among-communities, the result is often the use of coercion in integrating alienated communities. The greater the degree of coercion used, the more similar integration becomes to invasion and colonialism. This characteristic is less likely to be found in a pluralistic, egalitarian community, but it is almost inevitable in an amalgamated community. In the long run coercion is its own worst enemy and works as a disintegrative factor. Once disintegration

sets in, secession may result.

According to Deutsch, historical data shows that amalgamation failed to become integration in more than half of the situations in which military conquest was used to promote it. Now a pluralistic security community may appear a somewhat safer device than amalgamation for dealing with man's new weapons.⁹²

2. Loss of economic power: It is commonly held that industrialization plays an integrative role. Earlier it resisted being confined to city walls, now it resists being confined to limited political areas. The effort toward European integration reflects this need of industrial urbanism.⁹³

Community of economic life, economic cohesion, the development of means of communication and the rise of capitalism bound the country together.⁹⁴ The role of industrialization and capitalism was quite clear--to build up a nation against feudal diversities. For this reason, nationalism was identified with capitalism in the Marxist theory in spite of the fact that nationalism had existed long before capitalism. Haas and Schmitter argue that in Western Europe the element of automaticity is provided by the internal logic of industrialism, pluralism and democracy. Industrial society is the setting in which supranationality and a lively spill over process are able to flourish.⁹⁵ Though the effects of industrialism are generally acknowledged, some comments need to be made at this point.

1) Industrialization, transportation, mass communication are no more than material conditions which cannot trigger integration by themselves. The role of the individual and his perception play a significant role in the process. This is commonly acknowledged regardless of the philosophical

differences with respect to the problem of the priority of matter to idea. However, the speeding up of transactions and technology has not been paralleled by a speeding up of the human learning process which affects integration. This is the so-called 'cultural gap'.

ii) Economic complementarity which is the basis of industrialism may still be based on inequality, but at the price of cultural alienation. It is possible to have a high level of transactions in certain fields combined with very elaborate social barriers.⁹⁶ The conclusion is that industrialism must be accompanied by social justice for national cohesion and integration to be achieved.

iii) The same principle applies on the international level. It is in the interest of the wealthier states to subsidize some poorer area.⁹⁷

For these reasons, Monnet stresses the fact that "we are entering the age of abundance...For the first time we in the West are witnessing the emergence of a truly mass society marked by mass consumption, mass education and even mass culture."⁹⁸ An analysis of this statement shows that he attempts to link the modern technology and industrialism to social justice and to bridge the 'cultural gap' as a basis for European integration.

From the economic point of view industrialization and modern technology were important reasons for European integration as a means to provide the developed industry with a wider market. It was also the needs of American policy and industry that efficiency and power would be the by-product of free competition, in order to face the Soviet power and establish a free world market.

According to the study made by the Research Directorate of the Secretariat-General of the Council of Europe (Strasbourg, July 1955),

there is an urgent need to transcend the many small national markets which are no longer adequate to cope with modern technological developments.⁹⁹ However, economic integration is not without price. The study made by Sidney Dell provides important findings which can be summed up as follows:

History records that economic integration tends toward an economic polarization as the rich areas in a community or country grow continuously richer and the poor areas poorer. The economic development of Germany and the United Kingdom was accompanied by economic backwardness or stagnation in certain regions. The per capita income in the South of the U.S. lagged behind the North. In terms of industry, the South is most highly specialized in the textile industry, like many of the underdeveloped countries (though of course the average level of its per capita income is far higher than that of any underdeveloped country). Moreover, the extrapolation of the data suggests that immediately before World War II, regional per capita income differentials were actually greater in the U.S. than among the European countries, whether including or excluding Italy. The American experience cannot be held to rule out the danger of economic polarization in an integrated Western Europe.¹⁰⁰

Not only is polarization a possible price of integration, but also there has been a growing specialization of each country in those lines of production in which it has a comparative advantage over other countries. This has led to the disappearance of inefficient producers. The head of the French 'classes moyennes movement' put the problem as follows: Freeing trade will result in the transformation and closing of a certain number of enterprises. It is essential that the European idea does not become the pretext for the policy of the strongest against the weakest.¹⁰¹

Some economists tend to think that economic integration is often accompanied by two contrasting types of results. Gunnar Myrdal has labeled one set 'spread effects' and the other 'backwash effects'. The former includes such factors as increased demand in more developed centers for the products of the less developed periphery and the transmission to the latter of technological knowledge. The backwash effects include the movement of capital and skilled labor power toward the more advanced centers, thus tending to increase regional disparities in levels of economic development. Roger D. Hansen draws the conclusion that spread effects, which are likely to reduce regional disparities, predominate in a union of developed economies.

102

It should be noted that the above mentioned studies made by Sidney Dell show that the backwash effects are inevitable in a highly developed society such as the U.S., contrary to Hansen's conclusion.

The above study leads to the following conclusions. The first is that the more equal the partners are, the more successful integration is likely to be. Equality, if it does not stop polarization in the long run, at least gives every partner a fair chance at the outset. With respect to the comparison between the developed and developing countries, the second conclusion is that the former are able to integrate much better than the latter because they are more able to communicate across national boundaries, and have more capabilities to pay the price of integration.

With regard to the first conclusion, Monnet wrote, "the necessary precondition of such partnership between America and Europe is that Europe should be united and thus be able to deploy resources on the same scale as America."

103

Hallstein expressed the same idea by saying, "As

a basis for Atlantic partnership it was weaker still, not only because the United States and Canada had merely the status of observers in the O.E.E.C., but more especially because within it the separate nations of Europe were insufficiently united to speak with their transatlantic
 104
 partners on equal terms."

Contrary to this conclusion is the historical evidence given by Deutsch which shows that security communities seem to develop most frequently around cores of strength. For him, political amalgamation, in particular, usually turned out to be a nuclear process. It often
 105
 occurred around single cores. Etzioni repeated the same idea, only
 106
 changing the term 'core-area' into 'elite-unit'. The logical conclusion derived from the historical studies made by Deutsch is that this type of integration is the impact of the colonialist era. He owned too that the benefits of such non-egalitarian integration would go to the 'elite-unit'. The weaker 'partners' pay the price of integration. Moreover, they do not have a fair chance in the beginning to compete with the elite unit. Once a union is established, however, a unit's influence over
 107
 the union's course is more proportional to its real power.

At the present time the governments and the people--especially in democratic countries--are more conscious of the price of integration. That is why the pluralistic community, the functionalist, gradual, bargaining approaches are the characteristics of egalitarian integration.

The balance of power method is used to counter the hegemony of an elite unit whenever there is no even power distribution. The French hegemony in the E.E.C. is balanced by the German partnership. The Benelux supports the British entry into the E.E.C. to counterbalance the French-German axis. Etzioni holds that a dual elite-unit is more

promising for the success of integration than a multi-elite unit, as the latter would provoke more differences because each participant is constantly confronted with the possibility that the two or more others will
108
form a coalition against him.

If polarization is the price to be paid in the developed countries, one can expect that the developing countries have to pay an even heavier price for economic integration. They fear free competition, and for this reason they attacked the G.A.T.T. principles of the most-favored-nation clause and reciprocity in trade concessions as an old-fashioned laissez faire device benefiting only the rich nations. Protection is necessary for their development. It may take the form of import quotas, high tariffs, foreign exchange controls, tax differentials, outright subsidies or administrative measures.

On the other hand, during the United Nation Conference Trade and Development of 1964 they also opposed regional preferences and advocated equal preference for all developing countries, because they feared that regional preferences would mean dependence of the developing countries
109
on certain developed countries, which is a revival of the colonial preferential system.

The prospects for integration between the developing countries should not be taken for granted on the grounds that they are equal. In the first place equality is a relative term; they may be considered as equal when using an absolute scale. There is very little intraregional trade. The foreign trade consists essentially of exchanging primary products for manufactured goods, and they depend mainly on one crop for exportation. The trade routes and internal transportation systems are directed toward the ports for trade with industrialized countries. But

on using a relative scale, one finds that the developing nations are not equal and thus economic polarization can take place among them.

The problem which faces integration in developing countries is the issue of balanced economic growth in the union. Development and gains should not be measured against any absolute standard, but the major issue is that of gains relative to those of one's partner. The issues raised by the less developed Honduras and Nicaragua are the same as those set forth by Uganda and Tanzania. The conclusion drawn by Hansen is that for the less developed countries, economic integration is better conceptualized in terms of high politics, than its welfare equivalent in Western Europe; this finding limits sharply the functionalist theory of
110
Haas.

In this writer's opinion it should be noted also that the functionalist theory of Haas was also limited in the developed countries and he admitted that he under estimated the built-in limits of pragmatic interest
111
politics concerned with economic welfare. It is true that there is over politicization in the less developed countries when they are compared with the developed countries, but this does not refute the dominance of politics in these countries over incremental pragmatic interests. The difference between the less developed and developed countries lies only in that gross politics in the latter is on a higher level than in the former. Thus the functionalist theory loses its significance when using a relative and not an absolute scale.

An absolute homogeneity and similarity do not make a union successful. On the contrary, they provoke competition if the two countries produce the same commodities, or at least no advantages will result from the union. It is not sufficient for integration to be egalitarian; there

must also exist a certain degree of dissimilarity, in order to form a complementary union. It is inevitably a paradoxical statement, because dissimilarities make room for inequality. This is the dilemma of integration, economically, socially and politically. The internal contradictions and dissimilarities will always be present, yet this is a healthy condition and constitutes an incentive for interaction and integration. For it is commonly held that balance is the essence of federalism and integration. In the first place it is a matter of degree and should not be regarded in absolute terms. Secondly it depends on the way the politicians and the people handle this balance; they may selfishly limit the benefits to one segment of the integrated community at the expense of the others which pay the price of integration--thus leading to the development of a separatist movement--or they may have a social outlook and encourage cohesion.

3. Loss of political power, and the charismatic type of leadership:

The status of the political elites is affected by the process of integration. The elites of the weaker component unit inevitably lose power to the benefit of the elite-unit. When dictatorship is the political regime of the amalgamated community, the elite's power is more seriously damaged than in a democracy. Alienation, resistance and a struggle for power are the outcome, and if successful, the result is secession. Some concessions may be made by the elite-unit, but these are transitory and tactical, for a dictatorial regime by its nature does not accept anything but a monolithic and personalized leadership and absolute compliance. The struggle for power is apt to occur even when the political elites of the two component units are committed to the same ideology.

It is self-evident that even when there is a commitment to the

same ideology, the struggle for power will be rationalized. The ambiguity of political ideologies allows for such rationalization, or at least the rationalization takes the form of the 'right approach and application of principles'. A democratic pluralistic community would prefer to set up a system-elite or intergovernmental agencies, where a shift of power could take place gradually without threatening the elite's power in the nation states, thus mitigating the power struggle.

As for the type of leadership, Haas holds that charisma and national self assertion are "the worst enemies of integration."¹¹² It is true that De Gaulle--whom Haas had in mind--was against the supranational powers of the E.E.C., but this was also the attitude of the British Government. In any case, charismatic leaders tend to support integration but on their own terms, i.e. they are not absolutely against it, as Haas held. The plan submitted by the French Government to the Fouchet committee on November 10, 1961 shows that the idea of a permanent council of governments without formal constitutional or legal impediments to action and able to act where necessary without the concurrence of all members of the group was at the heart of the De Gaulle vision of how Europe should be run. The unanimity stage in the French plan was to be followed by weighting voting and¹¹³ ultimately by straight majorities.

This writer is inclined to believe that De Gaulle was against the shift of power to the technocrats, but not against a European integration led by politicians. A struggle for power is always at the heart of matters, but it is more tense when charisma rules. After all, Europe in De Gaulle's¹¹⁴ vision is between 'the Atlantic and the Urals'.

Henry Kissinger, as previously mentioned, studied the effects of charismatic leadership on foreign policy, but the writer is inclined to

differentiate between charisma in a developed and a developing country for the simple fact that there are cultural limitations built up in the Western World, whereas such limitations are weak in the developing countries and thus unable to restrain charisma. Philosophically the West is deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer. Empiricism and rational thinking has been built up in the Western culture. By contrast, charismatic leader in developing countries is less concerned with manipulating than with creating reality. He offers his vision as the only test and his good faith as the guarantee. Politically, he is much concerned with a quest for power, and sensitive to the threat of domestic upheaval. He represents an era of vast accomplishments but also of enormous disasters. He undergoes pressures to re-establish the legitimacy of his rule. For this purpose a dramatic foreign policy is particularly apt.¹¹⁵ The conclusions to be derived from this analysis can be summed up as follows:

The first is that the struggle for power is extremely tense, with no restraints, whether 'direct, indirect or natural' to use Ibragimov Brzezinski's classification of restraints. Alienation and coercion are the inevitable outcome.¹¹⁶

The second is that the charismatic leader tends to prefer union as the form of integration to the federal or the supranational form, as the latter forms would set limitations to the sovereignty of the state he rules i.e. to his personal power.

The third is that his vision of integration may become a dogma in itself, regardless of the exegesis of reality. He moves boldly either to great accomplishment or to disaster. Gradualism and functionalism are not his methods.

The fourth conclusion is that since the charismatic leader is under constant pressure to re-establish the legitimacy of his rule, foreign policy is used in an attempt to bring about domestic cohesion. Integration--for the charismatic leader--is an inevitable expansionist foreign policy, used to channel internal unrest to the outside. For these reasons, integration may be the great accomplishment of the charismatic ruler, or it may be an enormous disaster.

4. Rewards, Capabilities and Political Issues: If loss of sovereignty and of economic and political power is inevitable as a result of integration, then there needs to be sufficient rewards to initiate and sustain the integration process. The question is how great these rewards should be.

It is self-evident that the alienation of the deprived groups will be more concentrated and politically better articulated than the satisfaction of the gratified. The conclusion is that the rewards should by far exceed the losses. What initiates the integration process is not the actual rewards, since there is no union as yet to achieve them, but the expectations of the rewards. In the realm of expectations, the political appeals play an important role.

Political appeals are by their nature ambiguous. Unity may in itself become a driving force. It has its advantage as it gives the process of unification the necessary emotional push, but it has its disadvantage too because of its ambiguity. Deutsch found that there is a considerable gap between the general consensus on the desirability of a European association and perceptions of its forms. Ninety-one percent were in favour of European integration, but they were divided with respect to the form of this integration, whether it should include Britain (8%), the European

Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.) (22%), Eastern European countries
117

(18%). Unless these political appeals are sustained by rewards to provide the union with enough assets to stand the pressures of demands, these appeals would be the cause of future disillusionment, especially when they are over-used in the beginning.

In the initiation stage of integration, before the fulfillment of expectations, the unification is so fragile that any economic decline--even an accidental one such as a drought--is able to undermine it. Down payment and rewards must come before the penalties, and "rewards must be
118
strong and frequent enough to initiate the habit."

The refusal of the E.D.C. by the French Parliament was due to the fact that the revival of the German military power was to precede the rewards of the European unity. The burden was a fact, but the rewards, though true, were still only expectations.

The 'down payment' represents a burden and a price to be paid for integration. If integration pays later on, success will generate a need for more integration. Though this is generally true, it should not be taken for granted, as the European experiment proved that if more rewards are expected by adopting a nationalistic policy than by an integrationist
119
one the process does not spill over, though it may not spill back. So it may be said that the 'take off' stage needs a continuous 'fuelling' of rewards and expectations.

The dilemma is that though integration is born of weakness and frustration, it needs more capabilities to fulfill its expectations. In Deutsch's words "The governments of small countries would be jeopardized by their lack of power to act, and those of large countries or federations would be jeopardized by their lack of ability to pay enough

attention to claims and to respond to them."

The hypothesis presented by this writer is that the political appeals and issues play the decisive factor in the initiation stage but later on the achievements of integration are the test of its success. In reality it is not as simple as that, because though political appeals may be exhausted, politicians never cease to use the same issues or find new ones and provoke more expectations. This is one reason why in the less developed countries, the logic of economic integration may generally substitute over politicization for gradual politicization, significantly diminishing the relevance of current neofunctionalist theory.

5. Administrative Problems: With respect to integration the main question to be raised is whether the officials can develop loyalty to the supranational organization and transcend their loyalty to their nation states. Hallstein states as an accomplished fact that "an official of the Community would have found it necessary to explain and indeed to defend the European Community. He would have spoken not as a German or a Frenchman or Belgian, but as a European citizen with European responsibilities."¹²¹

The passive attitude adopted by the High Authority mitigated the problem of loyalty. Meyer defended the policy of the Authority by saying, "it is better to come to an understanding than to issue orders." On another occasion he also said, "the High Authority has opted for the second alternative and in doing so left to trade associations and governments a good many functions." Albert Coppe confirmed this attitude by saying "...you see the rights given to the High Authority exercised after consultation with the Council of Ministers."¹²² Because of this non

supranational attitude of the High Authority, Hoffmann may have been justified in coming to the conclusion "that we are still in the realm of strategic diplomatic behavior with its own rules of the game."¹²³

In conclusion, functionalism and gradualism as a method provided by the treaty and the diplomatic policy followed by the organization are justifications for Hallstein's statement about European loyalty since it does not contradict the national one. Moreover, it is almost an established fact in public administration that any bureaucracy sooner or later develops its own vested interests which solve the problem of loyalty to the benefit of the supranational organization.

The second question to be raised is the possible conflict between the two integrating components. One of the possible solutions suggested by Werner Feld is that "in view of the aspirations of many national civil servants in influential places to retain maximum control within their sphere of national competence, it is likely that the detailed administration of the common commercial policy would remain in the hands of the national administrative agencies, although the Common Market organs would have the authority and the responsibility to formulate basic¹²⁴ policy."

It is self-evident that whatever criterion is used, there is no strict borderline between centralization and decentralization, federal and provincial government, and supranationalism and the nation state. Even when there is a constitutional framework defining such borderlines, there is a growing interdependence and 'cooperative federalism' is the¹²⁵ outcome, to use Donald Smiley's phrase. It seems to this writer that such complicated problems will also be elevated to the supranational level, especially when the supranational agency takes over the responsibility of planning.

With respect to the developing countries, the administrative deficiencies are so great that it is very difficult for these countries to meet the rising expectations of integration. Since these countries are undergoing a stage of social change and modernization, the real problem which the administration meets lies basically in politics. The problems inherent in a traditional society and administration are a handicap for an efficient administration. Be that as it may, the real handicap to the development toward a scientific administration in military and authoritarian regimes lies within these regimes themselves, thus integration is handicapped.

In conclusion, any one of the previous approaches may succeed only in showing the shortcoming of the other approaches but is not alone capable of building up a paradigm or a proposition of integration. In fact the various approaches are complementary; the sociological factors are latent, but the political interests trigger the process of integration. A political bargain or an economic interest may be transitory. What is done by politicians may be undone; only the sociological factors and the continuity of interests can maintain the integration process. The functionalist approach may be incapable of developing political integration as there are built in limits within the economic integration, but a political decision devoid of the functionalist method is unstable and rests on unplanned, accidental convergence in outlook. For these reasons, integration on the international level is affected by the internal structure and diplomatic relations as well. It is an historical process, where the element of time makes it possible for all these factors to affect each other and determine the outcome of the process.

FOOTNOTES

1

Jean Monnet, "A Ferment of Change", The Common Market. Progress and Controversy, ed. Lawrence B. Krause (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 43.

2

Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 159.

3

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 84.

4

Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 101.

5

Jean Monnet, op. cit., p. 50.

6

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 5.

7

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968), p.7.

8

Ibid., p. 9.

9

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, pp. 79-80.

10

Ernst B. Haas, op. cit., p. 5.

11

Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification. A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Inc., 1965), pp. 56-57.

12

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 6.

13

A. H. Birch, "Approaches to the Study of Federalism", Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality, ed. J. Peter Meekison (Toronto: Methuen, 1968), pp. 5-7.

14

Ibid., p. 3.

15

Max Beloff, "International Integration and the Modern State", The Common Market. Progress & Controversy, ed. Lawrence E. Krause (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 115.

16

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 30.

17

Walter Hallstein, "N.A.T.O. and the European Economic Community", The Common Market. Progress and Controversy, ed. Lawrence B. Krause (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 59.

18

Ernest B. Haas, op. cit., p. 26.

19

W. S. Livingston, "A Note on the Nature of Federalism", Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality, ed. J. Peter Meekison (Toronto: Methuen, 1968), pp. 22, 26.

20

Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

21

Ibid., pp. 22-35.

22

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, pp. 124-133.

23

Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community", The Integration of Political Communities, ed. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1964), p. 21.

24

Werner Levi, "The Relative Irrelevance of Moral Norms in International Politics", International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 193.

25

Ibid., p. 192.

26

Ibid., p. 193.

27

Hans Morgenthau, "Power and Ideology in International Politics", International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 172.

28

Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., p. 23.

29

Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration. The European and the Universal Process", International Political Communities and Anthology (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 94-95.

30

A. H. Birch, op. cit., p. 7.

31

B. Crick, In Defence of Politics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), p. 34.

32

Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., p. 51.

33

Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers, p. 184.

34

Herbert C. Kelman, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy", International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 276-277.

35

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 78.

36

W. S. Livingston, "A Note on the Nature of Federalism", Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality, ed. J. Peter Meekison (Toronto: Methuen, 1968), op. cit., p. 21.

37

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 124.

38

Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 149.

39

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 90.

40

Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 270.

41

Jean Monnet, op. cit., p. 50.

42

A. C. Day, "Consequences of the Common Market", The Common Market. Progress and Controversy, ed. Lawrence B. Krause (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 65.

43

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 455.

44

Ibid., p. 24.

45

Ibid., pp. 21-22.

46

Ibid., p. 459.

47

Ibid., p. 77.

48

Ibid., p. 20.

49

Ibid., p. 129.

50

Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers, pp. 204-207.

51

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 29.

52

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 216.

53

Ibid., p. 152.

54

Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 20-22.

55

Ernst B. Haas, "The International Integration. The European and the Universal Process", International Political Communities an Anthology, p. 104. orig. International Organization, Vol. XV, No. 4 (Autumn, 1961).

56

Harold Guetzkow, "Long Range Research in International Relations", International Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 54.

57

A. H. Birch, op. cit., p. 6.

58

Ibid.

59

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 5.

60

Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Bruce & World, 1961), pp. 107-117.

61

Stanley Hoffmann, "Discord in Community. The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System", The Atlantic Community, Progress and Prospects, ed. Francis O. Wilcos, H. Field Haviland (New York: Frederic A. Prager, 1963), p. 12.

62

Amitai Etzioni, "The Dialectics of Supranational Unification", International Political Communities an Anthology (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1966), p. 141. orig. The American Political Science Review, Vol. LVI, No. 4 (December, 1962).

63

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. xxiii.

64

Amitai Etzioni, "The Dialectics of Supranational Unification", International Political Communities an Anthology, p. 141. orig. The American Political Science Review, Vol. LVI, No. 4 (December, 1962).

65

Amitai Etzioni, "European Unification. A Strategy of Change", International Political Communities an Anthology, p. 185. orig. World Politics, Vol XVI, No. 1 (October, 1963).

66

Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, p. 55.

67

Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration. The European and the Universal Process", International Political Communities an Anthology, pp. 101-102.

68

Amitai Etzioni, "European Unification. A Strategy of Change", International Political Communities an Anthology, p. 180. orig. World Politics, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (October, 1963).

69

Ruth C. Lawson, ed., International Regional Organizations. Constitutional Foundations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 116-117.

70

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. xxvii.

71

Amitai Etzioni, "The Dialectics of Supranational Unification", International Political Communities an Anthology, p. 141. orig. The American Political Science Review, Vol. LVI, No. 6 (December, 1962).

72

Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, p. 51.

73

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 83.

74

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 128.

75

Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification. A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, p. 59.

76

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 24.

77

Atlantic Alliance. N.A.T.O.'s Role in the Free World. Report by a Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1952, p. 100.

78

Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 507.

79

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. xxiii.

80

Ibid., pp. xxiii, xxiv, xxvi.

81

Werner Feld, The European Common Market and the World (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 153-170.

82

W. H. Ricker, Federalism: Origin, Operation and Significance (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1964), pp. 12-16.

83

Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration", International Organization, Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (winter 1969), p. 166.

84

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 156,

85

A. H. Birch, op. cit., p. 12.

86

Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, p. 286.

87

Elie Kedourie, "Pan-Arabism and British Policy", The Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 107-108.

88

A. H. Birch, op. cit., pp. 11-16.

89

Ibid.

90

Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, p. 286.

91

Philippe E. Jacob and Henry Teune, op. cit., pp. 38-41.

92

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area,

93

Jean J. Schokking and Nels Anderson, "Observations of the European Integration Process", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IV, No. 4 (December, 1960), p. 404.

94

Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1936), pp. 6-7.

95

Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections About Unity in Latin America", International Political Communities an Anthology, p. 285. orig. International Organization, Vol. XVIII (autumn, 1964).

96

Karl W. Deutsch, "Communication Theory and Political Integration", The Integration of Political Communities, ed. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1964), pp. 67-68.

97

Karl W. Deutsch, "The Price of Integration", The Integration of Political Communities, ed. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1964), p. 162.

98

Jean Monnet, op. cit., p. 43.

99

Sidney Dell, "Economic Integration and the American Example", The Common Market: Progress and Controversy, ed. Lawrence B. Krause (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 76.

100

Ibid., pp. 81-88.

101

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 296.

102

Roger D. Hansen, "Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts", World Politics, Vol XXI, No. 2 (January, 1969), pp. 255-256.

103

Jean Monnet, op. cit., p. 56.

104

Walter Hallstein, op. cit., p. 56.

105

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, pp. 28-37.

106 Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, pp. 45-46.

107

Ibid., p. 84.

108

Ibid., p. 69.

109

Werner Feld, op. cit., pp. 166-167.

110

Roger D. Hansen, op. cit., pp. 260-261.

111

Ibid., p. 250.

112

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. xxvi.

113

Max Beloff, op. cit., p. 117.

114

Ibigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), p. 252.

115

Henry A. Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 272-275.

116

Ibigniew K. Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 43-45.

117

Karl W. Deutsch et al., France, Germany and the Western Alliance
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. 161-163.

118

Karl W. Deutsch, "Communication Theory and Political Integration",
The Integration of Political Communities, p. 55.

119

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 16.

120

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 168.

121

Walter Hallstein, op. cit., p. 52.

122

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, pp. 461-470.

123

Stanley Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 9.

124

Werner Feld, op. cit., p. 162.

125

A. Donald and V. Smiley, "Public Administration and Canadian Federalism", Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality, p. 275.

PART II

A CASE STUDY: THE EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN UNION

I - SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

In the context of Arab politics, the sociological approach has to deal with the basic problems of religion, culture and ideology.

Religion

Some Western writers tend to emphasize the role of religion in Arab politics. The purpose of this study is to analyse this factor, trace its historical development, and determine its weight in the process of integration. We shall classify the development of Arab nationalism into four stages: 1. emergence, 2. revitalization of Islam, 3. secularization, and 4. military stage.

1. The Emergence of Arab Nationalism

C. Ernest Dawn held the opinion that "Arabism, as propounded by its creators and advocates, was, like Ottomanism, a defense and a vindication of Islam and the East in the face of the dominance of the Christian West... Perhaps many Arabs went over to Arabism from the feeling that Ottomanism was unable to achieve its goal i.e. to close the gap between Islam and the West."¹

In any social context, it is almost impossible to exclude any factor totally, because of the composite structure of society. Nevertheless, the writer holds that religion was not the basic factor responsible for the emergence of Arab nationalism. To be specific, Arab nationalism aspired to achieve independence from the Islamic Ottoman Empire. Religion could not be used effectively to hold together this Empire against the ascendance

of a nationalist movement. The Ottoman rule hastened the growth of nationalism in most of the Middle East and sharpened its intensity, to² use Manfred Halpern's phrase.

Logically, the Islamic religion could not be the driving force of the Arab independence movement since it was directed against the Islamic Ottoman Empire. Arab Christians played a basic role in this movement out of all proportion to their numbers. In the first Arab Conference which was convened in Paris on June 18, 1913, Christian Arabs accounted³ for almost half the delegates. The speakers, whether Moslems or Christians did not only ignore the role of the Islamic religion as a factor in Arab integration, but they stated also that the "Arab's pride of race takes precedence over religion", according to Mutran who was a Christian. Al-Zehrawi, the President of the Conference, said that "the bond of⁴ religion has always failed to bring about political unity." When one Egyptian listener requested to be allowed to speak, he was refused on the grounds that despite the fact that he was an Arab he could not speak at the conference since it was meant to deal with problems of the Arab⁵ provinces of the Ottoman Empire to which Egypt no longer belonged."

In World War I, the Arab nationalist leaders preferred to revolt and throw in their lot with that of Great Britain against Germany and the Ottoman Empire, which used the religious slogan of 'Holy War' in vain. Thus Arab nationalists thought in terms of Arab independence from the Ottoman Empire and not in terms of an over all Arab unity based on religion.

Taking these facts into consideration, it is difficult to assume the validity of Dawn's statement that Arabism was like Ottomanism, a

defense of Islam. In this writer's opinion, Arabism in its early stage was an independence movement, which refused to use the slogan of religion even as a tool, let alone considering it a driving force.

Robert G. Neumann stated the fact that Arab nationalism, though brought to the Near East by Christian Syrians and Lebanese, embraced the Muslim Arabs as well.⁶ But the fact should be stressed that it was not only a cultural participation on behalf of Christian Syrians but also an active political participation.

2. Revitalization of Islam (1838-1905 Afghani and Mohamed Abdu)

Richard H. Pfaff, in a recent article about "The Function of Arab Nationalism",⁷ states that the revitalization of Islam and the acceptance of the Arabic-Islamic heritage, was mixed with the idea of nationalism as a secular political movement. He holds that Islam still provides the Arabs with the prism through which reality is perceived. He also adopts a compromising attitude when he states that the Arabs, whether Christian or Moslem, Syrian or Egyptians, sought an intellectual framework that could assimilate 'selected' Western ideas without surrendering either to Western culture or Western troops.

With such generalizations as those made by Pfaff, which cover almost any attitude, ranging from extreme traditionalism (The Islamic prism) to modern secularization, as well as a compromising and selective tendency, it is difficult to take a stand and--most important--to see the movement of history. It is easy to find evidence for any of the above statements, since there is no society which has a monolithic culture or attitude. Even in a totalitarian regime there is always cultural dissent, and it is very easy to find extracts supporting any tendency. What is relevant to political science--as a science--is to determine the dominant attitude and the ascendant one through the historical movement. This does not mean, however,

that one should see it as a deterministic movement.

What must be emphasized in the revitalization of Islam is its insistence on the adaptation of medieval Islam to modern civilization. In order to do this, it is necessary to go back to the source, which is the Koran, and to purge contemporary Islam from the encrustations of tradition. Once this primary requirement has been fulfilled, basic Islam must be restored to its rank at the center of the social and political life.

3. Secularization (the 1919 Revolution)

The tendency of secular modernization, though it had its roots in the period of the French campaign and Mohamed Ali, achieved an absolute victory in the period of the national independence revolution of 1919, led basically by the Wafd Party. In the words of Dr. Hussein Fawzi, former Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Culture, "The dawn of Egyptian nationalism was to appear in 1919, for it shows all the characteristics of mature nationalism, with no trace of religion or cult."⁸

This tendency of Egyptian thought was of modernist, rationalist and liberal-democratic inspiration. "Egyptianness confronted cosmopolitan Islamism, and moderate liberalism confronted nationalist agitation tainted with pan-Islamism."⁹

Politics were shaped on constitutional democratic principles. Culture was built on a secular basis. We may give some examples of the modernization trend. Ahmed Lotfi as-Sayed propagated the Aristotelian methods and democracy. Taha Hussein introduced the historical method into the field of religion. Ali Abdel Razzek preached the separation of religion and state. Dr. Shibli Shemeil--a Syrian--introduced evolutionism.¹⁰ Salama Mossa called for Fabianism. The list embraced law, literature,

art, music and other fields of culture. The struggle was not an easy one, as most of these men were accused of atheism and suffered political persecution; but they became the political and cultural elite.

Pfaff saw the two stages of revitalization of Islam and secularization as one stage, a mixed one, at best aiming at a compromise. His list of the leading elites included only those who represented the stage of the revitalization of Islam with the exception of Ahmed Lutfi as-Sayed who was called later the 'master of the age'.

In fact the former stage paved the way for the second, though they seem contradictory. The criticism and the purge of traditional Islam meant automatically the dominance of reason, which is the essence of modernization as well as revitalization of Islam. After all, what is the Koran without its interpretations? The rule of Islamic law is empirically and basically the rule of reason, using religious generalizations as guidelines and in most cases as a rationalization to support either the interests of the ruler or the ruled. This was also the case even in the medieval Islamic state, as reported by Ibn Khaldun the Islamic historian. "Natural solidarity and religion are checked so far as they mean the sharing of power and are used at the discretion of the
11
absolute ruler."

It should be noted that there is no sharp lines between these stages. Within the stage of secularization there was an emergence of the Islamic revitalization as represented by the Fascist minority of Moslem Brothers, especially when the democratic regime could not adapt itself to the needs of social change.

It should be noted also that with the prevalence of modernization and secularization, the idea of Arab nationalism died out. But this does

not mean that Arab nationalism is identified with religion. As previously mentioned, religion could not hold the Ottoman Empire together, and the emergence of Arab nationalism was secular from the outset. Contradictory as the implications of the facts may seem, they indicate that Arab nationalism should not be sought in the realm of religion.

4. The Military Stage: Manipulation of Religion

It was necessary to draw the above mentioned preliminary conclusions in order to use them as a criterion in analysing the effect of religion on the politics of the military with respect to Arab nationalism. John C. Campbell holds the opinion that the army stands for a sense of mission¹² and for modernization of society, instituting social reform. P. Vatikiotis in more than one place asserts that the army can shape workable attitudes toward modernity, and that it appears as the group most inclined to push Arab society into the modern age by its serious commitment to secular¹³ policies and institutions.

With respect to Arab nationalism the U.A.R. President wrote in a preface to a work sponsored by the Liberation Movement that "we are a part of the great Arab fatherland stretching from the Atlantic shores to the mountains of Mosul...we are united by community of sentiments, as¹⁴ also by our common origins, by the bond of religion and language." In The Philosophy of the Revolution, he wrote, "Is it possible for us to ignore the fact that a Moslem world exists to which we are bound by ties¹⁵ that not only are those of religion but are attested by history." The Islamic Congress was established in 1954 as an agency of the Presidency of the Republic. Its extensive scholarship program was meant to be a tool for 'socialization'.

In more than one place, Vatikiotis, who taught at the American University in Cairo, stated that the military was justified in its manipulation of religion. In his opinion, it is still difficult for any ruler in the Middle East today to reject completely or legislate out of existence the Islamic heritage. Religion is still a major source of loyalty in the community. Moreover, religion is a ready medium of communication with the masses. Traditionally, religion and politics have overlapped throughout the history of Islamic nations.¹⁶

In other words, Vatikiotis holds the contradictory opinion that the military stands for modernization and secularization, but that it also manipulates religion in almost everything, legitimacy of government, communication with the masses, legislation and external affairs. There would be no contradiction in this if one adopted Machiavelli's opinion that ends justify the means.

This writer is inclined to refuse the arguments given by Vatikiotis to justify the manipulation of religion for the following reasons.

a) Contrary to the opinion held by many Westerners, politics--historically--in the so-called Islamic states has dominated religion. What facilitates the dominance of politics over religion is that Islam is not structured. The 'Ulama' (knowledgeables) are no more than state agents propagating the state policy, and at best they are only individual intellectuals. This secularization was not achieved through a struggle between the church and the state--it existed from the outset of Islam. In the religious text, there is no priesthood in Islam. Halpern touched the heart of the problem when he wrote that the revealed law was not translated into institutions strong enough to curb the tyranny of the Sultans.¹⁷ In this writer's opinion, such religious institutions would be a poisonous medicine, because

the tyranny of a religious institution is far more dangerous than the tyranny of a Sultan. Naturally, the Sultans tried to identify themselves with religion to achieve legitimacy, but religion worked as a kind of 'natural law' and a source of dissent. This is the lesser of the two evils. Ibn Khaldun wrote in the fourteenth century about the change of
18
the Caliphate into a mundane rule. This proves historically that contrary to the views held by Westerners, politics has dominated religion.

b) Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the wave of modernization and secularization grew, and reached its climax in the 1919 revolution, in which there was "no trace of religion and cult", to use Dr. H. Fawzi's phrase. Under such circumstances, the manipulation of religion was an unjustified and reactionary move which overlooked the gains achieved by the 1919 revolution. This was also a by-product, since it was the policy of the military to destroy democratic constitutionalism, and cultural secularization was interwoven with politics. It was a deep insight on the part of Halpern to mention the fact that cultural and social
19
problems in the Middle East are political issues.

c) There was no internal need or excuse for the regression towards traditionalism. Even Vatikiotis admitted the fact that "contrary to the view held by many Westerners, the average Muslim in the U.A.R. today is not concerned with the establishment of an Islamic state in the religious
20
sense of the terms." This fact was recognized by other writers and was stated by Egyptian journalists while trying (or ordered) to stir the
21
enthusiasm of the public for the Arab cause.

Due neither to the sociological background nor to public opinion, it was the policy of a charismatic leader who felt the inspiration "of a wandering character in quest for a hero to bring him to life...collapsed

on the borders of our country enjoining us to make a move since no one but us could do it so well..."²² The mystical, picturesque imagination of the U.A.R. President coincides with the manipulation of religion.

In the Charter presented by the U.A.R. President on May 21, 1962, after the secession of Syria, he stated that the Arab unity depends on the 'common history'. Religion was omitted, but as Pfaff correctly noted, to give nationalism a historical dimension, the Arab must turn to Islamic history.²³ This holds true because the slogan of 'common history', stated again in the Manifesto of March 30, 1968, was explained in the booklet distributed by the Ministry of National Guidance in terms of religion once again. "The Arabs were armed with a divine constitution... God granted them the honor to launch wars for the spreading of the message... The Arabs established a civilization based on the ethics of the Koran... Later on Arabism was not confined to a specific religion since the Christian in the Arab nation does not differ from the Moslem either in thought or in language."²⁴

To show the extent to which secular progress was set back it is necessary to quote Lutfi as-Sayed when he commented in 1913 on Islamic conquests: "The 'Salaf' (predecessors) used to say that the land of Islam was the 'Watan' (nation) of all the Moslems. This is an imperialistic rule, one that is applied by every nation desiring continually to enlarge its possessions and increase its influence over neighboring countries."²⁵ Arab nationalism as a policy based on common history i.e. Islamic history, is necessarily an expansionist policy, devoid of a divine message, since there are no pagans to be converted. The price is the alienation of the non-Moslem Arabs, as Halpern mentioned.²⁶ In this writer's opinion, traditionalism also alienated the intellectuals. Thus

modernization can not be identified with the military, contrary to the views held by Vatikiotis and Campbell, when one takes into consideration the former cultural progress and the cultural regression of the military.

What is the perception of the Arab Ba'th (Resurrection) Socialist Party which was responsible for the Egyptian-Syrian Union in respect to religion? Michel Aflaq--a Christian Arab nationalist theorist--is ambivalent. "From Islam the Arabs acquired strength, its rise gave birth to the first Arab nation state (the Ommayyad state) with religion, race and language being its main determinants. Islam is a revolution which only revolutionaries can understand. Arabs did not expand for the sake of expansion, but rather to fulfill a religious and lofty duty which was all truth...The secular state we aspire to should liberate religion from the influence of politics...and thus enable it to spread freely its genuine spiritual values among individuals and in society."²⁷

The Arab Ba'th ideology does not differ with respect to religion from that of the military ruling Egypt. Arab nationalism was given the same historical dimension, which necessarily implies the manipulation of Islamic religion as a means to achieve unity. A secular, modernized state is the objective, which implies no religious commitment. Religious values would spread freely, but these would be only the revolutionary values of Islam. In practice this would necessitate that the party and the state 'revitalize' Islam and select these revolutionary values. In other words, it is a secular state with revolutionary religious commitments.

The military in Egypt and the Ba'th of Syria are adopting the same ideas of the early nineteenth century, of the revitalization of Islam (the second stage) with a blend of nationalism. The difference between those who propagated the revitalization of Islam is that they were

religious people who got involved in politics, but the military and the Ba'th are statesmen who manipulate religion. Another basic difference is that revitalization of Islam was a cultural effort but with the military and the Ba'th, religion is no more than a slogan and a tool used to stir the emotions of the people for unity.

In conclusion, religion could not hold together the Ottoman Empire, which shows that social justice and political aspirations of independence were more powerful factors than religion with respect to integration. In the stage of the struggle of independence from the West, religion could not work as an integrative factor for Arab unity in face of the ascending secular nationalism. In the recent stage of the military and the Ba'th, religion is not a driving force in itself, but was used as a means to achieve political ends. Thus integration should be sought in other realms than religion.

Culture

Common culture is taken for granted as a determining factor in Arab integration. It is implied in the Islamic legacy, common history and common language, as propagated by the proponents of Arab nationalism. It is stated in the Charter presented by the U.A.R. President, and it was also written in the constitution of the Arab Ressurrection Socialist Party (Ba'th) that "the Arab Nation is a cultural unit. All of the differences among its members are artificial accidents which will cease to exist as a consequence of the awakening of Arab consciousness."²⁸

Other writers take for granted that there is diversity in Arab culture, relying on the fact that Arabic is not the speech of the populace in North Africa, Southern Sudan and Northern Iraq, let alone the

remnants of the Islamic Empire which once stretched from Spain to China.²⁹

Etzioni went too far in stressing that "the spoken dialects of Arabic in the two countries (Egypt and Syria) were dissimilar."³⁰ As a matter of fact, an Egyptian or a Syrian can make himself easily understood in Syria and Egypt. The difference in dialect is insignificant. Etzioni stated, also without evidence, that since Egypt experienced British rule and Syria French rule,³¹ they were culturally dissimilar. French culture fertilized the cultural renaissance of Egypt, beginning from Bonaparte's expedition, and the efforts of Mohamed Ali throughout the nineteenth century. In the period of British occupation, students trained at French universities provided the country with generations of intellectuals who in their turn endowed the country with her autonomous cultural substructure outside the traditional education and orthodoxy of Al Azhar. At the same time Egypt was the haven of refuge for Arab thinkers, especially Syrians and Lebanese, who played an important role in the Egyptian press, literature,³² and theatre. Thus, there were two trends in political writings: one emphasizing similarities and the other emphasizing dissimilarities, and neither giving the proper weight to each factor.

Some writers, like Halpern, stressed the fact that most "frontier lines were drawn by Europeans in an effort to compromise among rival European interests,"³³ thus implying a previous natural unity. This may hold true in certain areas, but historically schisms were an empirical reality during about 1273 of the 1313 years of Islamic history, and prior to Western colonialism. The Arab states were constantly at war with each other. But in order to convince the Egyptian public, the U.A.R. President laid stress in his speeches on the idea that imperialism spared no effort to alienate the heart of the Arabs and to divide them artificially into

countries and states. Be that as it may, the historical schisms are also an empirical reality, and a one-sided perception would therefore lead to an unrealistic policy.

In any case, proponents of Arab nationalism are satisfied with generalizations, but to speak broadly means that nothing is said. Our purpose is to study the present problems of Arab culture in order to determine whether it constitutes an integrative factor in itself, and is politically relevant or not.

To begin with, it is better to study the political elites' perception of culture. The minutes of the Tripartite Unity talks at the meeting of April 9, 1963³⁵ indicate that there were no more than the usual generalizations with respect to the question of culture. Abd el Karim Zahour, member of the Syrian delegation, admitted the existence of Pharaonic, Phoenician and Assyrian civilizations, but General Lu'ay al-Atassy protested against the use of Pharaonic costumes in certain Egyptian plays! Abd el Rahman el Bazaz, member of the Iraqi delegation, said that "we should draw inspiration from Arab civilization only, and any emphasis on historical 'perceptions' is a cause for separatism."

Whether these civilizations are so ancient that they have become irrelevant with respect to social behavior or not, no one thought of discussing at the conference. Other relevant questions also remained unasked: whether modern technology and industrialization have affected the way of life, and the types of city life have or have not yet asserted themselves; whether traditionalism would obstruct the process of modernization or not and would lead to ignoring the history of modern, secular Egypt; to what extent such distant traces of ancient civilizations affect political behavior...

No preparatory studies were made--a characteristic of such meetings--yet the military kept on saying throughout the meetings that they must benefit from the mistakes of the former improvised unity, and this time it should be a 'studied' unity. Possibly, they meant what they said, because they needed these studies, but they never owned the fact that it was they themselves who obstructed culture and studies by the very nature of their regimes. To give a specific example, a book about 'The Influence of the Civilizations of the Pharaohs on Today's Egypt' was considered 'distrubing' to the idea of Arab unity. Six centuries of Coptic Egyptian history were ignored. In the same way, the liberal and humanistic tendencies of the 'Wafid' Party were virtually erased from existence. Emphasis on Islamic culture was the aspect of the age. ³⁶ At the same meeting, the U.A.R. President said, with regard to education, that no book should be published except according to a centralized plan, and the above mentioned practice showed that he was thinking only in terms of command and censorship. He ended the discussion with the suggestion that they 'turn to the problem of unity', implying that the sociological and cultural approach was not a part of the problem of integration.

Thus, the minutes indicate that the ruling elite's knowledge of culture consists of no more than the usual generalizations. George Ketman wrote that "the officers surrounding Nasser can hardly spare any time for culture from the exercise of power." ³⁷ Dr. Mohamed Kamel Ayyad uses as an excuse that "the first task imposed upon us is undoubtedly to increase production." ³⁸ Thus the ruling elite's perception of the sociological approach is that it is irrelevant politically. Culture should be used as a tool to mold and indoctrinate the masses towards political ends.

To achieve cultural homogeneity as a condition for Arab unity, there was an inevitable regression to the nineteenth century period of the revitalization of the Islamic legacy, identified as an Arab culture, and the ignoring of any other culture, and especially the modern one.

To say that there is cultural homogeneity is not only a generalization, as previously mentioned, but also an oversimplification. An integrative factor should be in the first place a positive and an active power, with enough momentum to be a driving force. In the second place, there is no culture without intellectuals. It is they who materialize the thought and make culture a power. For this reason, it is extremely important to study the intellectuals' perceptions and attitudes, for if we come to the conclusion that there is a cultural crisis, and that the intellectuals are alienated, then culture is neither an integrative factor nor an effective tool in the service of the military.

A great debate regarding the cultural crisis took place in Egypt from March 12 to July 14, 1961, on the pages of the semi-official newspaper Al Ahram.³⁹ It is beyond our purpose to study the reasons which made Hasanein Heykal, the U.A.R. President's spokesman, initiate the debate, but it is one of the many techniques used by the military to control power through the means of communication. It is devised to spot opponents, to invite potential collaborators, and to absorb the feelings of unrest and assume a facade of democratic legitimacy.

The political aspect of the crisis manifested itself in that the intellectuals did not enter into relations of interaction with the revolution and refused to sponsor its cause, to use Keykal's phrase. So the intellectuals' alienation was a fact, admitted by the government itself.

The reasons, in his opinion, were related to the demand for the restoration of the parliamentary system (during the General Naguib crisis), and the dependency of the regime on 'trusted' men i.e. the military, rather than experts, and what came to be known as the slogan of 'loyalty, versus efficiency'. In other words, the President's spokesman had to write what the public was saying but dared not write despite the open debate.

The intellectuals dealt with the problem very cautiously. No one demanded the restoration of freedom, but some expressed the need for the formulation of a certain amount of criticism--an accepted formula in totalitarian regimes--but they had to cushion the request by duly praising the President. Most writers avoided--wisely--the political issues, and dealt with purely cultural problems--an area which serves to negate the accusation of passivity laid against them yet without involving them politically. They discussed the problems of technology, modernization and the cultural gap. Some dealt with the problem of cultural duality in the effort to bring back to life Islamic ideas as a component factor in personality, and the process of selecting the appropriate items from Western culture. Others admitted the impotence of culture, in that it lacked intellectual creativity. Dr. Ayyad wrote that "No one with a concern for our culture can help deploring the degree to which the standard of our scientific and literary publications has fallen off." ⁴⁰ Any follow up of the intellectuals' writings in 1968 and 1969 would find the same issues repeated, without any change. Their perception of the goal is not yet clear. Dr. Louis Awad likened the "revival of Arab cultural legacy to the resurrection of the dead, which needs a miracle. It is no more than a reprinting of the 'yellow books' (An Arabic symbol for old books) on white paper." ⁴¹ In another article he wrote that "we should not live

in the past, but the past should live in our present life. On the other hand the translation from Western culture did not help in developing our culture, because the creative capacity can only develop in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom."⁴²

In conclusion, Arab culture is undergoing a crisis, from the intellectuals' viewpoint. It is a chronic crisis, since the military is unable to provide the intellectuals with the atmosphere of freedom. As a social power, they are alienated from the regime, some may yield their 'pens' to earn a living, but never their hearts. Arab cultural legacy is empty and meaningless when it is seen through the prism of the intellectuals' perceptions and attitudes, and the Arabic 'yellow books' are no more powerful than the Pharaohs' Book of the Dead. No matter what wisdom these books contain, they can only come to life through the medium of the intellectuals, and these lack the freedom required.

Integration emanates from a position of strength both materially and culturally. Weakness may trigger the call for integration, in the hope that strength will be gained through unity, but it can never sustain it. Under the above mentioned conditions of confusion and alienation of the intellectuals, the cultural legacy, whether homogeneous or not, cannot acquire the power either to trigger or to sustain integration between Egypt and Syria.

Ideology

Political ideology, as defined by a number of writers, is supposed to provide a prescription for a complete reconstruction of society as a whole and establishes a claim to truth that has an absolutist character.

In the writer's opinion, ideology represents the link between the realm of sociological change and the realm of politics. Socialism is the most important ideological issue, which represents the politics of social change in the Middle East.

With respect to the ideological problem, there are three trends, which we may classify as follows:

- a) According to Emerson the nature of the evolution of the Asian and African states, and in what direction and in whose company they will travel, remain questions to which there is no confident answer.⁴³
- b) Another trend maintains, that the developing countries tend to refuse an ideological framework which may put restraint on their policies. Henry Kissinger states that ideology is not satisfactory for the charismatic leaders of the new nations, because doctrine supplies rigid categories which overshadow their personal experiences.⁴⁴
- c) A third trend, recognizing the fact that the Soviet model is being adopted, holds that the Soviet system appeared to correspond precisely with the pressing requirements, which were of course quite independent of abstract doctrine.⁴⁵ Kissinger wrote that the attraction of Communism is not Marxist-Leninist economic theory, but the legitimacy for authoritarian rule which it provides.⁴⁶ According to this trend of thought, Socialism is adopted, not as an ideological commitment, but as a device to provide the rulers either with legitimacy for authoritarian rule or with economic measures to meet the pressing needs of reform.

In other words, ideology in the Middle East is either refused by the ruling elites for fear that it constitutes a restraint, or it may be considered a mere device independent of doctrinal commitment, according to these writers. To examine the validity of these views, it is necessary

to study and analyse the conditions in Egypt and Syria. In the first place, there are two factors relating to the nature of the military regimes, which we may sum up as follows:

- a) The difficulty of determining the political ideology arises from the very nature of military regimes. The military take over power as a result of conspiracies and coups d'etat and not of political struggle based on the party system. Whether the party is legal or an underground one, its political ideology takes shape through the political struggle it has to undergo. With the military, power comes first, and the search for an ideology arises later as a result of the interaction with people. After nine years of the coup d'etat the intellectuals were criticized and asked by the U.A.R. President's spokesman "to give the revolution--through their thinking--its revolutionary theory."⁴⁷ In the Charter, the U.A.R. President wrote that "The revolutionary advance began without a clear cut doctrine for revolutionary change. The trial and error method is the road that leads to the attainment of maturity."⁴⁸
- b) The difficulty in identifying the ideology emanates from the fact that it is difficult to determine who are the political elites in power. In Syria "twenty-two officers representing twenty-two groups in the army, took the initiative in establishing the union."⁴⁹ Since the history of political thought in the modern era has not yet developed a sufficient number of ideologies to provide each of these groups with one, the conclusion is that ideology was not synonymous with power.

Again on March 14, 1963, during the "Tripartite Unity" talks, the U.A.R. President, repeated the same question, and asked the Syrian delegation "Who rules Syria? Am I going to deal with phantoms?"⁵⁰ He was not contented to deal with an official governmental delegation because he

wanted to know which group in the army held the real power.

With respect to the military in Egypt, Vatikiotis, who tried to tabulate the cultural factors that helped to mold the officers of the 'Revolution Command Council', came to the conclusion "that there were perhaps as many shades of political belief as there were members of the Free Officers Executive. Views ranged from extreme rightist, Islamic fundamentalist, and Fascist to left-wing radical socialist and Communist." 51 In this writer's opinion, it might be more accurate to say that there was no agreement between them with respect to ideology other than the political appeals of reform, but it is difficult to identify any one of them with a definite attitude, as Vatikiotis did. In any case, out of the twelve officers, members of the Revolution Command Council, nine have been eliminated. The quick turnover may consolidate power or may lead to more changes and confusion about the identification of political ideology.

In the second place, Emerson, Kissinger, and Carmichael though they differed with each other, tended to isolate the political thought in the Middle East from any ideological commitment. In other words, those writers evaded identifying the politics of the Middle East with Socialism. If this was inevitable at the outset of a military coup d'etat, it does not hold true once military power is stabilized and the vague political appeals are translated into policy. There are many reasons to evade such a judgment:

a) Kissinger maintains that there are deep-seated philosophical attitudes reflecting themselves in the intellectual works that would prevent even the intellectual from passing judgments and setting criteria. This is a result of pragmatism and empiricism which tend to divert attention from

the act of judgment to the assembly of facts. "The contribution of the intellectual policy in terms of criteria, that he has played a minor role⁵² in establishing."

Vatikiotis' writing is an example of such an attitude. He refuses to apply democratic standards as a criterion to judge political performance, considering that the very maintenance of the state is the major task of any ruler in these countries. Since Vatikiotis offered no other criterion either, he came to the inevitable conclusion that "in fairness to the present regime in the U.A.R., one must withhold final judgment until many⁵³ more years have passed." In this writer's opinion, since contradictions are latent in any situation, the recording of facts results in confusion, so long as there are no criteria.

b) Some writers ventured to touch upon the theoretical difficulty of identifying the ideology of the Middle East countries, but without developing criteria or reaching a conclusion. Walter Laqueur, in order to prove the difficulty of finding criteria, stated that some writers⁵⁴ have described the Soviet regime as state capitalism or state socialism. It seems also that the Communist organizations in Egypt could not develop criteria for identifying the ideology of the Egyptian regime. They differed between labelling the military as representative of the national middle⁵⁵ class or as the instrument of the monopolist upper middle class.

Halpern wrote also that modern political science, pioneered by the West, has so far developed no adequate analytical discrimination, nor even sufficient terms for differentiating among alternatives in the Middle Eastern countries. According to him, a 'sensitivity' is needed to differentiate between the radicals and the extremists on the basis that the⁵⁶ former avoid violence. In this writer's opinion there are two factors

which caused this confusion of writers in dealing with Middle Eastern ideologies.

a) Not only did the military take over power without having a clear cut ideology, but later after years of trial and error, they adopted a gradualist policy with regard to the attainment of socialism, and there was no assurance that this policy would come to an end. A partial nationalization could be identified with liberal reformism and a state interventionist policy, but this viewpoint would change if partial nationalization were seen as a gradualist policy aiming at the attainment of socialism. The U.A.R. President admitted having such a gradualist policy when he wrote in the Charter that the July, 1961 laws of nationalization were a part of a continuous process aiming at the attainment of socialism.⁵⁷ Moreover, the socialist implication of the Egyptianization of foreign capital was missed. It was considered as a nationalist policy motivated by external conflicts such as the Suez War, and later the death of Lumumba, which was taken as an excuse for nationalizing Belgian interests.

In conclusion, the socialist implications of the gradualist method and nationalist policy were missed. A partial nationalization could be considered as an interventionist liberal policy though there was no assurance about the limits of these 'partial' measures, and state capitalism was confused with socialism, as previously mentioned by Laqueur.

b) This confusion in identifying the ideologies of the Middle East is also due to changes in Soviet politics, and their impact on domestic politics. The most important changes, which took shape at the Twentieth Party Congress were the recognition of the third neutral camp, that there could be different roads to socialism, and the slogan of peaceful coexistence.⁵⁸ As a result of this policy, the Communist Party in Syria, like

those in other developing countries, asserts itself as a non-violent
 59
 reformist opposition party. On the other hand, John Kautsky states that
 Communism is defined not as some ideology of the past, but as whatever
 movement abroad Moscow backs. Communism has become more identical with
 60
 nationalism in underdeveloped countries.

Taking these comments into consideration, it could be concluded that
 the effect of the new Soviet policy, blurred the ideological differences
 between Communism and nationalism, between nationalization and state
 intervention, and between violent revolution and peaceful change. The
 above mentioned conditions may explain the writer's confusion regarding
 the identification of political ideologies in the Middle East, but they
 do not justify it. Had the changes in Soviet policy and the gradualist
 method been considered as tactical steps leading to the attainment of
 socialism, ideology would have remained the distinguishing factor between
 bourgeois nationalism and socialism.

Joel Carmichael wrote that "among scholars it may become an occupa-
 tional disease to accept rationalizations at their face value. Thus, the
 doctrinal explanations of Soviet policy are often overemphasized at the
 expense of a more functional or materialist explanation based on practical
 61
 interests." In other words, ideology and not practical tactics--however
 rationalized--remain the criterion. Even Khrushchev, who was supposed to
 cover the ultimate objectives, considered that transplanting into ideology
 62
 the conception of peaceful coexistence is a mistake.

The real dilemma in the Middle East, which confused the writers and
 policy makers in the West, lay in the fact that socialism was implemented
 without a Communist Party, in addition to the gradualist method and tactical
 devices adopted by the military and the Soviet Union and their rationalizations.

The intellectual on the lookout to find any change, however minor or insignificant it may be, influenced by an empirical, pragmatic attitude (Kissinger), and taking rationalizations at face value (Carmichael), leads only to confusion. After all, it is not the organization which determines the policy but the other way around.

Nevertheless, it is important to study the political ideology of the Ba'th Party in Syria and of the military in Egypt, in order to find out whether there was ideological homogeneity between them or not. The scope of the subject is so broad that it is necessary to select some important topics for discussion.

a) Arab socialism--Both the rulers of Egypt and Syria use the term 'Arab socialism' in order to assert their ideological independence from any particular doctrine. M. Aflaq, the Ba'th theorist, says, "Arab socialism is independent...does not follow a particular doctrine...but benefits from all theories..."⁶³ In Egypt, the Minister Kamal Rifaat analysed the characteristics of Arab socialism and used the same phraseology, "Arab socialism is a national socialism...but this does not prevent it from entering into interaction with other socialist theories."⁶⁴

This assertion of ideological independence has caused confusion and differences between the writers. Hans Tiesch wrote that socialism in this part of the world is merely a label covering all sorts of government intervention.⁶⁵ There is hardly any serious study of Socialist doctrines. The implication of his statement is that Arab socialism is not socialist. Tiesch's opinion was regarded by Abu Jaber as "a hasty condemnation and a superficial observation."⁶⁶ For him Arab socialism, while primarily a nationalist movement, found in the manipulative character of socialism a means of providing a social content to its nationalism.⁶⁷ Yet he agrees

with Halpern, who tends in more than one place to assert the nationalist aspect of Arab socialism and says that socialism comes next to national-
 68
 ism. The essence of these arguments is based on the assumption that nationalism is opposed to socialism and that the former comes first. It should be noted that Halpern wrote also that "it was easy to miss the socialist features that were connected even with the most dramatic
 69
 nationalist events," and thus he implies that Arab nationalism adopted socialist ideology. Nevertheless, nationalism helped to create the myth of a doctrinal independence. Later on it was no more Arab socialism, but only socialism adapted to the peculiar circumstances of the Arab world, which conforms to the slogan of the 'different roads to socialism', and Arab nationalism was considered a sentimental reaction against the inter-
 70
 nationalism of Communist doctrine. Thus Arab nationalism is more a negative attitude than a mature positive doctrine.

However, a similarity in phraseology is not an indication of ideological homogeneity. The minutes of the Tripartite Unity talks at the meeting of April 7, 1963, indicate that the Ba'th Arab socialism, according to its constitution, was considered by the U.A.R. President as 'democratic bourgeois'. The Ba'th leaders answered him that nationalization of private capital should have been applied more firmly to isolate the
 71
 reactionary elements. Thus the Arab socialists accused each other of not being socialists. It is true that facts are mixed with propaganda, and such statements were also expressions of frustrations resulting from the failure of the union, but they also show the need to examine the content of Arab socialism, regarding specific issues, such as freedom of association, land reform and nationalization.

b) Freedom of association--According to Anabtawi, the differences between

the U.A.R. regime and Arab nationalist organizations now seem to revolve around the question of freedom of association. The latter maintain that the freedom of association they seek means the formation of doctrinal associations whose objectives do not contradict those of the Egyptian revolution.⁷² The question to be discussed is whether there is ideological homogeneity between the Egyptian military and the Ba'th Party with respect to the freedom of association or not.

The spokesman of the U.A.R. President wrote that, in contrast to Communism, which believes that the organization of political activity should be kept in the hands of the Communist Party alone, Arab socialism believes that the organization of political activity should extend to the entire nation.⁷³ Since political parties were banned, the answer to the question of how could the entire nation participate in political activities was circular. The Minister Kamal Rifaat wrote that there should be neither pluralism of parties nor a single party; it is the masses of the people that should play the leading part.⁷⁴ This does not differ much from the neo-Maoist strategy appealing to 'all classes' without being tied to the weak working class in the developing countries.⁷⁵ According to the minutes of the Tripartite Unity talks at the meeting of March 19, 1963, the U.A.R. President did not consider the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.) to be a dictatorship of a party, but rather a coalition of the working people's classes; because dictatorship in his opinion is either that of a social class or of a political party with limited membership which monopolizes political activity.⁷⁶

Thus in the U.A.R. President's opinion, the Ba'th is a democratic bourgeois party according to its constitution but also a dictatorial party according to the criterion of membership. Yet in the Charter he

recognized "the need to create a new political apparatus within the framework of the A.S.U. to mobilize the eligible elements for leadership."⁷⁷

This came to be known later as the 'underground organization', and was disclosed by the U.A.R. President after the 1967 defeat. This means that the idea of a one party system which was denied ideologically was in fact implemented. Thus it was one of the conditions set by the U.A.R. President in 1958 to accept the union between Egypt and Syria that all party activities should completely stop, and that the Syrian parties must dissolve themselves.⁷⁸ But at the meeting of April 9, 1963 in the Tripartite Unity talks, he had to agree on the principle of "the freedom of forming people's organizations in the member state."⁷⁹ The formula was vague, but it was supposed to cover opposing ideas; the U.A.R. President's insistence to ban any political activity outside the A.S.U., his submission to the Ba'th Party condition that it should not be dissolved, and a compromise on behalf of the Ba'th to include within the framework of each political front not only the Ba'th but also the other unitary parties in favor of the U.A.R. regime. In any case, this agreement was considered⁸⁰ to be transitory, until a 'united national leadership is formed'.

As for the Ba'th Party, its doctrine with respect to the freedom of association seems to be contradictory. On the one hand the Ba'th constitution states that the system of government in the Arab state will be representative and constitutional (article 14).⁸¹ Abu Gaber wrote that Aflaq nowhere demanded a one party state. M. Razzaz concluded that the existence of political parties was a prerequisite to the achievement of popular democracy.⁸² Possibly this was the reason why the U.A.R. President considered that the Ba'th constitution was democratic bourgeois.

On the other hand, M. Aflaq holds that the freedom of parties and associations is limited to those in agreement with the goals preached by the Ba'th, and that they can differ with the Ba'th in methods only.⁸³ But methods are interwoven with the goals, and a tactic may be considered a deviation from the goal, especially in the developing countries which are undergoing rapid social change, and where opposition is identified with treason. In the Congress of the Syrian Communist Party, Khalid Bakdash said that "anyone who will read our 'National Pact' will find it devoid of any mention of socialism. It is a democratic national pact."⁸⁴ Such an attitude would not have been considered in the Stalinist era as a tactic to reach the same goals. In fact these two seemingly opposing ideological tendencies in the Ba'th Party are not contradictory. The freedom of association is meant to ensure the freedom of the party so long as it is an opposition party, but once it takes over power, the freedom is violated. Zuhur, a Ba'th delegate, said flatly at the meeting of April 7, 1963, in the minutes of the Tripartite Unity talks, that the revolutionary movements call for democracy to provide themselves with the best conditions for political activity, but once they rule, they find⁸⁵ that such bourgeois democracy is dangerous for the revolution.

In conclusion, Arab socialism did not develop an independent road to socialism. A mass organization in contrast to a one Communist Party, cannot possibly include the 'cream' of society, to use Lenin's phrase. It is unable to lead the people--since it is the people--nor to pressure the policy-makers (which is very convenient for the latter) until a crisis of communication erupts as it did following the 1967 war.

The wording is sentimental and the idea fits in with a platonic city state, without fulfilling its conditions. It is a party without

an elite, yet denied the title of a party, simply because parties were banned, regardless of the phraseology used. It had to be complemented by an inner party to include the elite, but it was given the name of a political apparatus which came to be known as the 'underground organization'.

The one innovation made by Arab socialism is the new wording--a social characteristic typical of the Arabs who "are swayed more by words than by ideas," according to Edward Aitya.⁸⁶ Politically, this innovation in wording helped not only to assert the Arab national identity, but also confused their opponents, who were unable to identify their ideology.

This writer does not agree with Anabtawi, who holds that there are differences between the U.A.R. regime and the Arab socialists with respect to the question of freedom of association. On the contrary, from the ideological point of view there is absolute ideological homogeneity between the Egyptian military and the Ba'th in that they both deny the freedom of association, especially after they take over power. Paradoxically, however, this ideological homogeneity intensifies the power struggle, and actually resulted not in integration, but in the dissolution of the Union.

c) Land reform and nationalization--With respect to the class struggle, the Ba'th Party's view does not differ from that of the Egyptian military. According to Aflaq the Ba'th believes that the majority of the people--⁸⁷ not one class--has an interest in changing the existing order. The Egyptian minister Rifaat wrote that Arab nationalism was not born of a rigid society like European socialism, the product of capitalism, hence

the character of the state is that of the whole of the people. Thus
doctrines of the Ba'th and the military are similar to each other.

As regards private property, the Ba'th constitution states that the ownership of small industries will be regulated in accordance with the economic level enjoyed by the rest of the people (article 31), but large scale industries will be the property of the nation (article 28).

Furthermore, the party will prevent the exploitation of labor (article

89

164). Similarly, the U.A.R. President's spokesman wrote that Arab socialism believes that a distinction should be made between property representing labor and the property of the exploiter who must be stripped of the weapons that enable him to exploit others.

90

The Egyptian minister Rifaat wrote that nationalization, the first stage in the building of socialism, should be distinguished from those of the capitalist type and the right to private property should not bring about a rebirth of the capitalist system. Thus, Arab nationalism did not create an independent ideology to define exploitation in contrast to the Communist doctrine of 'surplus value'.

91

At this stage, nationalizations were not just a nationalist reaction against foreign capital, but a policy aiming to build socialism, and prevent the rebirth of capitalism. By not setting up a criterion to determine exploitation, it became possible to adopt a gradualist method.

There was therefore an ideological homogeneity with respect to the goal and the gradualist method between the Egyptian and Syrian rulers, though some writers differentiated between them. Gebran Majdalany con-

siders that the Ba'th is anti-Communist for political more than ideologi-

92

cal reasons. By this he means that the Ba'th is ideologically of Communist orientation. W. Khalidi considers that the Ba'th is to the right of the Communists but at no great distance, and to the right of

the Ba'th is Nasserism.

Obviously there is no way to quantify such distance, since the goal is the same, and the gradualist method is the adopted policy. It is true that in the minutes of the Tripartite Unity talks, the Ba'th criticized the U.A.R. President for not applying the nationalization laws more firmly, and by this the Ba'th did not mean to criticize the socialist policy, but demanded that political measures should be taken against reactionary elements.⁹⁴ After all, it was the Egyptian regime which issued the nationalization laws on July 1961, while the Ba'th was in opposition since December 1959.

Etzioni also holds that the Egyptian military was more to the right than the Ba'th on the grounds that the agrarian policy was not radical enough and consistent enough to please the leftist intellectuals, and that the Ba'th also objected to a decree regarding the state as the successor to landlords whose lands had been requisitioned, taking over their bank debts. This was considered by the Ba'th as compensating the landlords.⁹⁵

This writer does not agree with Etzioni because the land reform was an Egyptian policy which had been adopted since 1952, and its implementation in Syria was not a result of the leftist intellectuals' pressure. It is true that the U.A.R. President's spokesman wrote that Arab socialism⁹⁶ "prefers compensation for nationalized property" contrary to Communism.⁹⁷ But in practice this was never implemented, since the compensation was in non-negotiable forty year bonds, bearing one and one half percent interest. Though the interest was due annually, it was the policy of the state not to pay it, until in 1967 when an internal crisis took place as a result of the defeat in the war. The U.A.R. President's spokesman

discussed the crisis in the internal front, and wrote that it was not intended to return the fortunes to those under sequestration, but that they should not be left in society like 'wandering ghosts'.⁹⁸ A year later, the interests were paid.

It is difficult to consider the state's repayment of debts owed by landowners as compensation to the latter, since this measure was taken to benefit the creditors in view of the insolvability of the debtors as a result of drought. In any case, the main creditor was the state agricultural bank. Hence, it is clear that Etzioni's comments are groundless, and at best of minor importance. They do not affect the ideological homogeneity with respect to goals and methods.

With respect to this ideological homogeneity, certain comments need to be made. First, socialism became the state's doctrine after the issuing of the nationalization laws on July 23, 1961, three years after the union between Egypt and Syria which took place on February 21, 1958, and two months before the secession of Syria on September 28, 1961. The above mentioned opinions, which shaped the theory of Arab socialism, were expressed by state officials on August 4, 1961, and March 18, 1962, after socialism had become a fact. In other words, action came first, and theory came later, to communicate to the people what had already been accomplished.

The U.A.R. President admitted that he proceeded through trial and error, the latter constituting forty to fifty percent of the action, and it was eleven years of 'practice' which led to the foundation of a theory.⁹⁹ Before 1961, and prior to the emergence of the Egyptian-Syrian union, Arab socialism was no more than a political appeal included in the slogan of 'Cooperative Democratic Socialism', and it was defined vaguely as

social justice, a kind of welfare state. The Egyptian constitution of 1955, prior to the union, defined the Egyptian state as a democratic republic. The Provisional Constitution issued on March 5, 1958, after the proclamation of the union, declared that 'social solidarity is the basis of society, private property is inviolable, and that the law organizes its social function.'¹⁰⁰ The social function of private property is a democratic principle propagated by French jurists, to oppose the 'absolutism' of the right of private property, but does not contradict its inviolability.

Second, following the secession of Syria, the U.A.R. President, as well as the Ba'th leaders during the Tripartite talks, considered the ideological homogeneity, i.e. socialism, as the prerequisite for unity. The semi-official Al-Ahram newspaper announced the withdrawal of Egypt from the United Arab States (which comprised Egypt and Yemen) on the basis that "the U.A.R. is not prepared from now on to merge in a unitary of federal state with any Arab country unless such country follows a socialist policy."¹⁰¹ Oded Remba wrote rightfully that "Cairo's accelerated march toward 'Arab socialism' widened the already irreconcilable social and economic gulf between the Nassir regime and the traditional monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Yemen."¹⁰²

The U.A.R. President wrote in the Charter that the U.A.R., as a part of the Arab nation, has to spread its principles without paying attention to the worn out argument that this action would be considered intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.¹⁰³ In an interview with the Indian journalist Karanjia on April 17, 1959, the U.A.R. President developed a doctrine concerning the right to intervene in the internal affairs of any Arab state since it is a part of the

Arab nation, and on this basis he rationalized his campaign against Iraq.¹⁰⁴

On June 29, 1958, he attacked Lebanon for its complaint about Egyptian infiltration on the basis that Lebanon turned an internal crisis into an international one.¹⁰⁵

Thus the U.A.R. President developed a doctrine similar to the one adopted eight years later by the Soviet Union, which holds that the community of socialist states has the right to intervene in any Socialist state in which internal developments are endangering the survival of socialism.¹⁰⁶ So Arab socialism adopted an expansionist policy which intensified the conflict between the Arab states instead of developing peaceful integration.

As for the Ba'th, in spite of its doctrinal commitment to socialism, and whether in or out of power, it has not learned to live in peace with itself, and inner struggles continue to rock it, to use Abu Gaber's phrase.¹⁰⁷ There are many factors for this instability; one, mentioned by the Near East Report, being that the skillful politicians in Syria won office, not by pleasing the voter, but by coming to terms with the currently ascendant army clique.¹⁰⁸ But, using the army in politics is a two-edged weapon.

One of the reasons of the February 1966 coup d'etat was that the extreme leftist Ba'thist officers were unhappy about the attempt of the moderate wing in the Ba'th Party to get the army out of politics. Personal rivalry took on the appearance of an ideological struggle, with the left wing composed mainly of officers, outbidding their rivals in their zealous approach to socialism.¹⁰⁹

As the power struggle erupted within the Ba'th Party, in spite of its political commitment to socialism, the same struggle took place between the Ba'th and the Egyptian regime, regardless of ideological homogeneity. The U.A.R. President considered that the commitment to

'the goal' was one of the weakest types of ties. In his opinion, integration should take the form of an amalgamated political activity under a
110
united national leadership. This attitude intensified the power struggle within the framework of socialism, because it implied the dissolution of the parties forming the national front.

II - INTEGRATION AS A PROCESS

The emergence of the Egyptian-Syrian union took place on February 21, 1958. Some writers hold the opinion that this political unification was the outcome of a process of gradual, functional unification which manifested itself in cultural, economic and defense agreements concluded within the framework of the Arab League or bilaterally between Egypt and Syria.¹¹¹

The purpose of this study is to examine in the first place the validity of this opinion and then examine the problem of the linkage between economics and politics which is the basis of the functionalist theory as propagated by Haas.

a) Cultural Sector--In 1945 a Cultural Treaty within the framework of the Arab League was concluded. The basic purposes of the treaty were the exchange of students, teachers and professors, the harmonization of Arab educational syllabi and cooperation in the revival of the intellectual and artistic legacy of the Arabs. Two main achievements were attained, the first was the establishment of the 'Institute for the Revival of Arabic Manuscripts', and the second was the establishment of the 'Institute of Higher Arabic Studies'. On March 25, 1957, an Arab Cultural Agreement was signed between Egypt and Syria, whose objectives did not differ much from those of the Cultural Treaty concluded within the framework of the Arab League. According to Dr. B. Ghali "cultural cooperation is the most solid achievement of the League."¹¹² It should be noted that these agreements were successful only in their conclusion but not in their implementation. For example, the Permanent Arab Congress, in the sessions of 1954 and 1955, found it necessary to remind the Arab

Governments to carry out the resolutions of the first Arab Cultural Conference which were endorsed by the Council of the Arab League on February 22, 1948.¹¹³ The 'Arab Cultural Agreement' signed on March 25, 1957 between Egypt, Syria and Jordan states the same principles provided for by the first Cultural Treaty agreed upon by the Council of the Arab League on November 27, 1945, implying that no development had been realized since 1945.

The above mentioned institutes had specific and technical functions that had no political repercussion. The exchange of teachers was used by the Egyptian military to "carry the Nasser brand of Arab nationalism into the class-rooms."¹¹⁴ This Egyptian policy handicapped the implementation of cultural agreements between the Arab states, but with respect to the relations between Egypt and Syria, it was no more than an indication of the elite complementarity, otherwise these teachers would have been sent back to their homeland. The study of the Egyptian-Syrian agreements indicates the priority of politics over economic and cultural functionalism. The mutual Defense Pact between Egypt and Syria was concluded first, on October 20, 1955, as an answer to the Baghdad Pact, and it was followed by the economic agreements which were signed on September and November 1956. Later, on March 27, 1957, the 'Arab Cultural Agreement' was signed. Contrary to Haas's theory, it was not economic functionalism which triggered political unification. Yet, this does not imply that integration in the defense sector spilled over into the economic and the cultural sectors. All of them were the outcome of political considerations, which manifested themselves first in the military sector, and then later in the cultural and economic sectors without any inter-relation between these. Thus the dominance of high politics was asserted.

b) Economic Sector--The scope of the subject is so broad that it is necessary to give a summary of the data. On June 17, 1950 'The Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation' was signed between the member states of the Arab League as an answer to the partition of Palestine. The main objectives of the economic portion of the treaty were to facilitate the exchange of agricultural and industrial products and generally to organize and coordinate their economic activities. On September 7, 1953, a convention was signed to facilitate trade, and agreement was reached on the exemption and preferential treatment regarding customs and import duties but not export duties, these exemptions being applied to selected products. On January 14, 1959, the treaty was amended and provided for the exemption from export duties as well as from customs and import duties, but the U.A.R. and Yemen made reservations to this amendment. As to the import-export permits, the Provisional Council of Economic Unity at its first session in 1959, after the emergence of the Egyptian-Syrian union, recommended that these permits should be restricted to products which were essential for local and supply purposes.

With respect to Arab economic unity, the Economic Council, on June 3, 1957, approved a draft agreement for economic unity among the Arab League member-states, based on the principles of the freedom of movement of individuals and capital, freedom of exchange of national and foreign goods, and the formation of one customs area. At its Fifth Session in 1959, the Economic Council discussed a draft submitted by the U.A.R. calling upon the member states to expedite the conclusion of the draft agreement for economic unity. The Economic Council established a Provisional Council to study the steps necessary to attain the

facilitation of exchange of Arab goods and products, and the freedom of practice of economic activity. In 1959, the Provisional Council recommended that import-export permits should be restricted to products which were essential for local supply purposes. It called for the realization of the Arab Common Market, as an answer to pressures of the E.E.C. and its associates which increased the E.E.C. bargaining power with respect to Arab exports, consisting mainly of raw materials. On December 30, 1957, the Syrian delegation called for industrial coordination to avoid industrial duplication in many industries, which would hinder Arab unity because of competition. On June 17, 1960, the Iraqi delegation proposed a draft agreement for the realization of a complementary economy and technical cooperation between the Arab states. Failing to reach any agreement, the Economic Council referred all the drafts to the Council of the Arab League.

While every state was active in presenting drafts for economic unity, each was adopting a protectionist policy which made the integration process unworkable. A good example is the reservations made by Egypt and Yemen against duties exemptions. As to import-export permits, the U.A.R. accepted the recommendation of the Provisional Council to abolish these permits, on the assumption that this abolition took into consideration the needs of supply and economic development. At the meeting of April 10-17, 1961, of the Economic Council, the U.A.R. delegation asserted again that the needs of economic development justified the financial restrictions made by the U.A.R. As Anabtawi says, these projects remained on paper.

As regards the transfer of capital, the convention for the transfer of capital was signed on September 7, 1953, for the purpose of

economic development projects, but was not implemented either. ¹¹⁵ In 1961, a Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development was established with the purpose of providing Arab states with loans necessary for the execution of their development programs. Whether it was a transfer of capital or the provision of loans, the process was handicapped by the socialist policy adopted by the U.A.R. Saudi property in Egypt was nationalized on July 23, 1961, and the Egyptian banks in Saudi Arabia were seized on February 10, 1967. ¹¹⁶ Kuwait carefully stipulated that a special undertaking by the country receiving the benefit of the loan be made to exempt the Fund's assets and revenue from nationalization, confiscation and sequestration, ¹¹⁷ indicating the fear of the government from socialist measures.

In the Tripartite Unity talks, the U.A.R. President admitted that he had made every effort to unify the economic sector 'in vain'. There was an inclination to import from foreign countries, and customs duties were not abolished in order to protect national industries from competition. ¹¹⁸ In spite of this protectionist policy, a number of Syrian factories closed down as a consequence of the union, with one Damascus ¹¹⁹ paper estimating at 65 factories. Egyptian control over the economy, such as currency control and new import restrictions, and the freezing of foreign currency led to a fall of the Syrian pound, with the result that capital fled the country. Thinking in political terms, the U.A.R. President denounced the 'dictatorship of capital', to justify his economic measures, and put the blame for the secession of Syria on the 'reactionary and regionalist forces', but later in the Tripartite Unity talks, he argued the necessity of a gradualist approach towards economic unity, thus admitting the incorrectness of the policy adopted in the period of the union. The Syrian Chamber of Commerce stated that "Syria's

prosperity depended on her system of economic freedom, as contrasted to the completely different conditions reigning in Egypt. Moreover, Egypt tried to block Syria's road to industrialization.¹²⁰"

The U.A.R. President's spokesman wrote in his book entitled What Happened in Syria that Egypt in 1958 was on the threshold of the social revolution while in Syria there were shadows clouding this fact. In another place he wrote that Egypt was carrying out the industrialization plan while Syria was not prepared for such a step,¹²¹ thus implying that socialist measures did not coincide with the level of Syrian development, and perhaps making excuses for stressing agricultural development in Syria at the expense of industrialization.

With respect to the functionalist theory which holds that economic integration leads to political unity, the present study shows that no real economic integration took place. The economic agreements and drafts remained on paper, without implementation. Political conditions triggered political unification, i.e. the Arab League and the Egyptian-Syrian union as well as economic agreements. Later, political conflicts made these economic agreements inoperative. First it was the rivalry between the Hashemites to induce Syria to unite into the Fertile Crescent or the Greater Syria.¹²² Later, it was the rise of Arab nationalism and the campaign against the Baghdad Pact which divided the Arab world into pro and anti West camps. But the peak of the conflict came not only as a result of Arab socialism but also because of the expansionist and interventionist policy adopted. There was no superiority of step-by-step economic decisions over crucial political choices; contrary to Haas's theory. What the Arab rulers failed to comprehend was the need to depoliticize the functional activities of the Arab League. It was only

after the 1967 war, that the semi-official Al-Ahram called for such a change, so as to make use of the Arab funds of the rich oil states, but the spokesman of the U.A.R. President realized that this was a remote
 123
 dream.

As for the Egyptian-Syrian union, it is one thing to speak about industrial coordination and economic complementarity and another to make the decisions which will affect certain economic sectors, and the social classes related to them. To stress the agricultural development in Syria, and the promotion of irrigation projects may be a wise policy in a country where the total area under cultivation is about 5.5 million hectares and of this total less than eleven percent enjoys some means of irrigation
 124
 while the rest is dependent on rainfall. It is also wise in terms of integration to promote the mobility of labor from Egypt, a country with a high population density, to Syria, and especially to the Jazirah region
 125
 where the average density is 15 inhabitants per square kilometer. In Syria only a seventh of the arable land is under cultivation, which indicates the need for Egyptian manpower. Generally, there is also an
 126
 exportable surplus of grain crop which is needed in Egypt. Though cotton is a main product in both Egypt and Syria, there was no problem of marketing, since the armament policy caused this product to be absorbed by the Soviet market.

This complementary economy is countered, however, with a regional need for industrialization and self sufficiency. Modernizing elites in most less-developed countries have identified industrialization with development, and industrialization has become a goal that transcends cost-benefit analysis. To proceed with the development of a complementary economy would identify integration with the colonialist type of

economic relationship of the nineteenth century and to decelerate this policy means the promotion of a 'separatist' economy. Under such circumstances, there must be a balanced development in both the agricultural and industrial sectors, even at the expense of the economic benefits of specialization, but this industrial development has to take into consideration "the explosive political issue of balanced economic development" to use Hansen's phrase. In periods of rapid social change, the integration process cannot withstand the repercussions of the said change.

As regards the form of integration, the amalgamated union is likely to be less successful than the pluralistic one. The rulers of Egypt and Syria did not make use of the long period prior to the emergence of the U.A.R. to implement gradual economic integration and put into practice the ideas of a coordinated industry and a complementary economy. The U.A.R. was established as a unitary state which was held responsible for the repercussions of rapid social change. Had it been a pluralistic community where national states retain their sovereignty, the responsibility for such repercussions would have been distributed between the federal and the regional states in such a way as not to harm integration.

As to the functionalist theory of Haas, which holds that economic integration automatically triggers political union, the present study shows that the attempts to integrate the two economies triggered disintegration. Haas's amended theory recognized that economic integration devoid of ideological commitment is ephemeral, but this study shows that the attempts to integrate the two economies, though they were reinforced with the power of the state and ideological homogeneity, could not withstand the social repercussions of the economic measures either. Integration based on pure economic considerations of specialization also

cannot withstand the political needs of industrialization and balanced development. Though the neo-functionalist theory tended to treat politicization as a distinct process, this study shows that political considerations triggered the conclusion of economic treaties and thus proved the dominance of high politics. But economic integration was one of the reasons that triggered the disintegration of the union. In a study of integration, economic factors and political considerations cannot be treated as distinct processes.

The relationship between economic factors and politics may be one of gradual politicization, of occasional crises, or of drastic disintegration, because disintegration and integration are simultaneously at work. It should be taken into consideration that the process of integration depends also on the creative personal action of politicians and administrators who can act in a balanced way. For this reason, the ideological and the charismatic types of leadership, though they perceive the contradictory factors of integration and disintegration, are less able to deal with these problems because they are restrained either by an ideology or by a self-made vision.

III - INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

Legally the U.A.R. was an amalgamated union, and the personalities of Egypt and Syria were not extinguished but continued in a combined form, and therefore there was no need to apply for membership of the United Nations.¹²⁷ Heykal gives the impression that the unitary state was the demand of the Syrian military who came to Egypt and met the U.A.R. President, taking their government by surprise.¹²⁸ There is no doubt that Syria initiated the union, but that the Syrian military demanded a unitary state and not a federal one is another thing.

In a wave of self criticism (such waves followed every crisis and were aimed at absorbing the public opinion's anger by expressing it), Heykal admitted that the union was premature and that "the conditions were not ripe for it."¹²⁹ But self criticism is designed also to include the government's defence in order to make it acceptable. The blame for the failure of the union was put on the Syrians not only for initiating the union but also for demanding this particular type of union, i.e. a unitary state. Heykal's argument about the unitary state raises two problems. The first is that--according to him--the Syrian National Assembly passed a resolution in favor of the unity (Wihda).¹³⁰ By this he meant to prove that the unity had been Syria's demand, and not the U.A.R. President's. In actual fact, the Syrian Parliament had unanimously agreed on the formation of a committee to negotiate with Egypt for a "federal union."¹³¹ The second problem which Heykal wrote was that when the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs was called to Egypt,

to legitimize the Syrian officers' move, he stated the Syrian govern-
 ment's request for 'unity'.¹³² In fact, he brought with him a letter
 from the Syrian President requesting that the U.A.R. President take steps
 to implement a federal union between the two countries,¹³³ which coincided
 with the Parliament's resolution.

Though the Ba'th Party adopted the slogan of 'unity', it did not
 mean an amalgamated union but a federal one. Aflaq said that the
 Ba'thists wanted two things which may seem contradictory, a federal state
 with strong and centralized institutions, but one which will make allow-
 ances for the different political histories of the two countries.¹³⁴
 Logically, it is hard to believe that such a fragmented group of officers,
 meeting the U.A.R. President in a hasty and conspiratorial manner, and
 requesting union with Egypt to save them from a political crisis, were
 in a position of strength to impose any conditions, if it were not the
 U.A.R. President's stand that unity was the only form acceptable to him.

Any analysis of the Tripartite Unity talks which took place in
 1963 would lead to the same conclusion--that the U.A.R. President's
 perception of union was still that of a unitary state. The Ba'th of
 Syria and Iraq came in 1963 with a definite plan of a 'federative unity'.
 They wanted to begin with a federal government and achieve unity grad-
 ually. The U.A.R. President considered this suggestion as "separatist,
 but he welcomed the unity."¹³⁵ The Iraqi delegate said flatly that
 those who call for an immediate unity are Egyptian-paid agents.¹³⁶

The present study shows that the unitary type of state is pre-
 ferable to the charismatic leader than the federalist form. Because
 this type of leadership arises during a period of struggle for independ-
 ence or revolutionary social change, the charismatic leader tends to

think in terms of political power. For him, integration is identified with the state, and the state with power. The state is the manifestation of social cohesion. For him the union is the highest stage of integration, contrary to the "Western-style democracy which pre-supposes that society transcends the political realm."¹³⁷

Though the U.A.R. President was aware that 'unity' was identified with Egyptian colonialism, and the Ba'th aimed at balancing the Egyptian hegemony, his stand was for an amalgamated union. At the end of the tripartite talks he accepted a federal unity, as demanded by the Ba'th of Syria and Iraq. But when the Ba'th took over power in Syria and eliminated the other parties, the U.A.R. President refused to implement the tripartite union agreement. This shows that he did not believe in federalism and abolished the agreement at the first opportunity.

The situation was very paradoxical in that the Ba'th maintained freedom of association in order to prevent the U.A.R. President from banning political parties as a condition to the union, yet it banned these parties in Syria. The U.A.R. President did not believe in freedom of association, but he cancelled the tripartite agreement because this freedom was violated and in spite of the fact that he wrote in the Charter that "the U.A.R. should take care not to get involved in domestic party conflicts in any Arab nation."¹³⁸

For the charismatic leader it is a matter of either unity or separation, because he believes in total solutions, to use Kissinger's phrase.¹³⁹ Federation as a gradualist method is rejected at the first opportunity, because the charismatic leader is less concerned with methods than with purpose. Whatever the ills of the unitary state may be, such as the alienation of the Kurdish and Shi'a minorities,¹⁴⁰ the intense

power struggle, and the difficulty of economic integration, still for him a unitary state is the remedy for all ills, because "his vision
 141
 is the primary significant reality to him."

Etzioni holds that the U.A.R. President, as an astute politician, chose the gradualist approach of sector integration leading toward, rather than trying to jump into, a political community, until his hand
 142
 was forced because of political factors. However, the present study shows that the economic integration was never treated seriously. Moreover, Etzioni's statement overlooked the fact that charismatic leaders tend to think in terms of power and total solutions, so long as they can. To say that the U.A.R. President's hand was forced is to overlook the fact that federation was a gradualist approach, and an alternative to unity which he had refused.

IV - POLITICAL APPROACH

External Threat

Hansen criticized the functionalist theory in that it failed to relate the process of regional integration closely enough to the relevant international system. As regards the background conditions of the Egyptian-Syrian union, the Middle East underwent a period of political change, from an era of colonialism or semi-colonialism to an era of national independence. What differentiated the nationalist movements in the Middle East and divided them into two camps, pro and anti West, was their view regarding the Communist threat. The ultra-nationalist movement intensified the independence struggle, regardless of whether the Communist threat was external or internal. For this camp, the Western powers represented the main and immediate threat. The second camp considered the Communist threat as the main one. For this camp the West was a potential ally as soon as the independence problem was solved. On the other hand, the colonialist powers did not act in such a way as to help the nationalists who were anti-Communist. The United States was handicapped by its relations with the colonialist powers and its extensive fear of the Communist threat. Egypt and Syria represented the ultra-nationalistic camp and for them the West represented the external threat.

The political crisis in the Middle East revolved around the Baghdad Pact (1955), the Suez War (1956), the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), and it reached its peak when Turkish troops began to mass on Syria's border and the United States' Sixth Fleet manoeuvred off the Syrian coast (1957). The objective of this threat was to persuade Syria to

join the Baghdad Pact, and dissuade her from promoting relations with the Soviet Union. The Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defence Pact signed on October 20, 1955 was an answer to the Baghdad Pact. Egyptian armed forces had been moved to Syria around the middle of September, 1957,¹⁴³ during the Turco-Syrian crisis.

In the writer's opinion, the integrative factor of the external threat has been exaggerated, since the threat was met by the implementation of the Defence Pact. The permanent tension in the Middle East did not sustain the union, because of the disintegrative repercussions of the union, which surpassed the integrative factor of the external threat. Thus, one should take into consideration the interaction between the external factor and the internal structure of the union. As for the international effect, it should be noted that the increasing presence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East removes the impetus for political integration. The Soviet protection of Syria is the substitute for an inefficient Egyptian protection.

As for the nature of the external threat, some writers tend to consider it as an integrative factor, but in this writer's opinion, the threat must fulfill certain conditions in order to trigger integration. In the first place, it should not be a successful threat, because integration means a refusal of the threatener's demands. David Singer, in discussing inter-nation influence, stated that the lesson seems to be to use enough threat to generate stress but not so much as to produce

high anxiety and reduce rationality.¹⁴⁴ According to Karl Frost the

pressure exerted on Syria was extreme.¹⁴⁵ Thus it only served among other reasons to push Syria in 1958 towards the political union with Egypt. The Syrian officers, in their meeting with the U.A.R. President,

argued that the external threat was an impetus for initiating the union. The utility or the disutility of the threat, which is a subjective variable, to use Singer's phrase,¹⁴⁶ left no choice to the nationalist and anti-Communist Syrian leaders, who thought in nationalistic terms. The Syrian President said, in answer to the Eisenhower Doctrine, "if there is a vacuum of power in any land or region, only the people of this land can fill it."¹⁴⁷ The Syrian Minister of State, defending the conclusion of the economic agreements with the Soviet Union, said, "If our economy collapses...will that be a barrier to the penetration of Communism?"¹⁴⁸

In conclusion, the present case study shows the interaction between the international system, the internal structure and the external threat, and that the latter should fulfill certain conditions to be effective.

External Power Interests

The Egyptian-Syrian union differed from the Arab League in that the former emerged as a reaction against external threat, but the latter was initiated by an external power when the British Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that the British government would give support to any scheme for Arab unity.¹⁴⁹ The fact that Britain, which dominated the Arab world, initiated the Arab League, threw much doubt about the nationalistic role of the League in an era of struggle for independence. Anabtawi held that it was meant to hinder this struggle since the "speed of the fleet has to be the speed of the slowest ship."¹⁵⁰

The U.A.R. President's spokesman wrote that the Arab League was meant to be the substitute for Arab unity.¹⁵¹ The U.A.R. failed in spite of its national initiation, but the Arab League remained in spite of its external initiation. As previously mentioned, after the 1967 war there

was still the hope of initiating a functional depoliticized integration, within the framework of the Arab League.

Price and Rewards

1. Loss of Sovereignty: On February 1, 1958, the merger of Egypt and Syria was proclaimed. The proclamation declared the adoption of a presidential democratic system and stated that the executive authority would be vested in the head of the state, assisted by ministers appointed by him. On February 5, 1958, a program was announced by the two Presidents. The program envisaged a single national assembly that would be appointed by the President, at least half of which had to be appointed from among the members of the Syrian House of Representatives and the Egyptian National Assembly. Each region would be administered by an Executive Council appointed by presidential decree. ¹⁵² On March 5, 1958, a Provisional Constitution was issued by the U.A.R. President. Article 58 of the Provisional Constitution declared "that each Executive Council had the competence to examine and study matters pertaining to the execution ¹⁵³ of the general policy in the region.

Dr. Boutros Ghali spoke of the Provisional Constitution as being based "on dualism, a sort of equality between Egypt and Syria, and that the regional Executive Councils represented an administrative decentral- ¹⁵⁴ ization." Legally the sovereignty of both Egypt and Syria was sub- merged with the emergence of the U.A.R. But the shortcoming of the legal analysis lied in the fact that it does not show how the institu- tions work in the societal and political context. The Syrian military,

after the secession, declared that the program was based "on good faith and aspiration for unity, and therefore the unity was unconditional."¹⁵⁵

Marshal Bizri in his book about Nasserism, a Neo-Colonialism, wrote that the Syrians committed the mistake of not recording the details of the agreement, and that the texts were vague.¹⁵⁶ The Syrian Executive

Council worked on the assumption of equality. For example, K. Kallas, the Syrian Minister of Economy, suggested that in the case of luxury items, high tariffs be imposed instead of excluding them altogether.

He considered that under the law still in effect in the Northern Region, the governmental departments were allowed to adopt new rules, but the U.A.R. President made it clear that he expected to be consulted before these rules were put into effect.¹⁵⁷

In October 1958, a central government was organized in Cairo, and was given the power to lay down the policy for both the Northern and Southern Regions, while the two Executive Councils would have the power to run the local government and to implement policies of the central government.¹⁵⁸

In 1959, a presidential decree gave the Vice-President, Marshal Amer sweeping powers to rule Syria, e.g. to promulgate decrees which come from the President of the Republic and to examine the recommendations of the Executive Council of the Syrian Province.¹⁵⁹ On August 16, 1961, the U.A.R. President abolished the regional Executive Councils and set up one single Council, and thus the Syrian governmental personality was extinguished.¹⁶⁰

The present study shows that the merger process consisted of three stages, political, constitutional and governmental. At the political stage, the proclamation of the union declares in a very generalized manner the political framework of the union, and thus makes it possible for contradictory interpretations to be made, i.e. whether the union is

based on a centralized, hierarchical government or on a sort of equality between the two regions. Dr. B. Ghali holds the opinion that the union was based on a certain sort of equality between the two regions. The hasty move of the Syrian military, which was justified by them as having been in 'good faith' (which was politically irresponsible on their part) made the merger bear the seeds of disintegration since its birth. In the second stage, the issuing of the constitution by the President, one partner had already been eliminated, and the stronger one could make use of the generalized political proclamation. In the third stage, the governmental implementation of the agreement, there was a gap between a united constitutional structure and two different legislative structures-- a legislative gap. The Syrian Minister of Economy worked not only on the political assumption of equality, but also in conformity with the law, since the laws of Syria remained in effect so long as they were not changed by the union. The U.A.R. President expected and demanded to be consulted before any action was taken, though the Syrian Minister of Economy in imposing high tariffs on luxury items did not contradict the policy of the state.

In a report submitted by Luther Gulick and James Pollock to the Egyptian government in June 1962, it was written that "this structure-- the executive branch--now brings every last authority, power, responsibility, and duty to make decisions to one point and one man. This is known to political science as 'absolutism', an absolutism now made more sweeping and inclusive by extension of the State into the economic and social life of the nation."

Moreover, it should be noted that the competence of the Executive Council and central government were defined in a very generalized manner,

and so the President had the last word not only in policy making but also in administrative decision making. This type of political system and personalized leadership intensified the feeling of the loss of sovereignty.

The present study also shows that though the union was based on equality between the two regions, since each began by having a separate Executive Council, this equality withered away gradually, in favor of the stronger partner. Thus each region's influence over the union's course was proportional to its real power. A unitary state inevitably leads to this result, i.e. loss of national sovereignty, regardless of any political statement made at the proclamation of the union.

2. Administrative Problems: Contributory to the collapse of the U.A.R.

were a number of mistakes. One of these consisted of defects in the government machinery. The U.A.R. President, in self-criticism, said that the government machinery lacked the full ability to act as a tool

162

of the revolution. In other words, this self-criticism placed the blame for the failure of the union on the government machinery, but not on the political leadership. In a period of social change, the bureaucracy may be committed to a traditional ideology which does not coincide with the political ideology of the political leadership,

163

and thus handicaps the implementation of reforms. Though this is right in general, it is not always so. In cases of coups d'etat, the military has to rely on the bureaucracy and the power of the state to carry out the reforms. On the other hand, in a society devoid of political institutions, the opposing political ideology is weakened, since it is not structured, and any resistance on the part of the bureaucracy is also weakened. In fact, the political leadership and the

bureaucracy are so amalgamated, that Gulick and Pollock suggested a splitting of the assignments of the Supreme Executive into two parts, one of which would be the head of the state, while the second would be the chief of the administration.¹⁶⁴ Successive administrative purges and the grafting of the bureaucracy with the military, increased the amalgamation between the bureaucracy and the political leadership.

The fact remains, however, that the government machinery was too inefficient to carry out the revolutionary plans, and the additional burdens of integration. According to Gulick and Pollock's report, the structure of the government, as previously mentioned, brings every last authority, power, responsibility and duty to make decisions to one point and one man. The case of the Syrian Minister of Economy shows that this practice was demanded personally by the U.A.R. President. This absolutism is responsible for the lack of initiative found in the administration. In addition to this, an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty prevailed because of the successive administrative purges. Moreover there is an excessive system of controls, which inhibits the exercise of prompt and effective action, to use Gulick's phrase.¹⁶⁵ The U.A.R. President's spokesman admitted the existence of an atmosphere of fear in the administration.¹⁶⁶ What matters is not just recording the facts but understanding their causes. The present analysis indicates that the deficiency of the government machinery is due basically to the political structure. It is absolutism which handicaps the integration process.

Gulick's report spoke about the over-concentration of governmental activity in Cairo, which had become a handicap to efficient, democratic national life, and to the full development of human and cultural resources.¹⁶⁷ It is possible to theorize about the historical roots of the bureaucracy

and relate centralization to the hydraulic society, as the U.A.R. President's spokesman did. But absolutism, as a political system, tends to concentrate power, and in a case like the U.A.R. this would deeply affect the integration process, especially because of the geographical obstacle and the lack of sufficient communication. The abolition of the Syrian Executive Council--even after its responsibilities had been reduced to the level of a local government--is a manifestation of this type of political regime.

To give an example of the concentration of power in Cairo, a decree was issued forbidding all governmental agencies from purchasing foreign goods except with the written approval of the office of the President.¹⁶⁸ A study of the administrative legislation in Egypt shows that this concentration of power, which extends to the detailed administrative work, is the common practice in Egypt. This handicaps efficient administration, as even the minister himself is deprived of ordinary administrative power. The psychological atmosphere is one of fear and distrust, which paralyses administrative efficiency. Shukri al-Quwatli, the last Syrian President before the union, and the 'First Citizen of the U.A.R.' published a statement in which he wrote "Government was not merely authoritarian, it was¹⁶⁹ utterly inefficient as well." Thus, this study shows that the inefficiency of the government machinery is the product of the political system which accelerates the centralization and concentration of authority beyond the capacity of the administration and the ability of one man.

As to the unification of laws, the Syrian Armed Forces Command stated on October 2, 1961, that the Egyptian laws were imposed on the Syrian region.¹⁷⁰ Marshal Bizri wrote that any dispute within the Egyptian and Syrian committees was settled by imposing the Egyptian system in all

instances. In other words, it was not a process of balanced integration, but of Egyptianization, and it led to the disintegration of the union.

Etzioni holds that a centralized unitary state is not responsible for the failure of the union, since the Arab League, which is much weaker, also failed. In this writer's opinion, the two cases are too dissimilar, and therefore the analogy is groundless. In any case, what weakened the Arab League in its recent history was not only the ideological schism between the Arab states, but also the expansionist policy which would have led, if successful, to a unitary state. Because this policy failed, it only weakened the Arab League but did not destroy it. In the case of the U.A.R., the secession took place because this policy was carried out to the full.

3. Loss of Political Power: The U.A.R. President agreed to accept the principle of the union on the condition "that Syrian parties must dissolve themselves and that the Syrian army must become a tool for defense only and not for authority."¹⁷² Abu Jabir wrote that the Ba'th Party "did not hesitate to sacrifice its separate existence: it was willing to dissolve at Nasser's request in 1958."¹⁷³

Contrary to this statement, a power struggle erupted as soon as the union was established. To begin with, Syria underwent successive coups d'etat since it obtained its independence, so that by the end of 1957 the army was fragmented into opposing groups. As previously mentioned, twenty-two officers representing twenty-two groups came to Egypt asking for unity and described to the U.A.R. President the cleavage between them and the emergency situation that was found in the barracks.

They failed to produce a leader capable of restoring cohesion inside the army. According to Frost, a perplexing stalemate existed that could at any moment break into a disastrous civil war.¹⁷⁴ It seems that this is a correct interpretation, since Marshal Zahr El-Din who presided over the secessionist government wrote that the unity was a "solution for accidental problems."¹⁷⁵ Though he did not clarify what these accidental problems were, the phrase implied the conflict that existed between army officers.

This power vacuum is an ideal situation for a coup d'etat, but each group was suspiciously watching the other, so they all had to look outside for a charismatic leader. Unusual as it may seem, the union achieved under such circumstances is nothing more than a coup d'etat, in which an external military force, i.e. the Egyptian one, was used to achieve it. The Syrian military agreed to the condition of banning political parties, because military rule had lost popular support to such an extent that the army was unable to rule directly and had to use political parties as a cover, a situation which was not convenient to either of them. The military's agreement to ban political activities did not prevent them from expecting to be rewarded by ruling Syria. Heykal quoted the U.A.R. President as saying to Sarraj, the head of the Syrian intelligence service, "All you wanted was to rule Syria."¹⁷⁶ What the Syrian military overlooked was that they added another power to the struggle, i.e. the Egyptian leader. He decided that Egyptian control of the Syrian army would be achieved under cover of an exchange program ostensibly designed to integrate the two forces. Groups of Syrian officers were successively discharged, under thinly veiled pretexts, one of the most often repeated being the professionalization of the

Syrian army, to use Etzioni's phrase.

What the U.A.R. President overlooked was that the successive purges, though they were agreed upon, provoked dissent. According to Marshal Zahr-El-Din, the secession took place before a new wave of purges was about to be put into effect.¹⁷⁸ Etzioni holds that it was the gradualist policy which alienated the Syrian officers, though it did not suffice to render them harmless.¹⁷⁹ In fact it was not a gradualist policy as held by Etzioni; the rising dissent made the purges a continuous process--a phenomenon known in authoritarian rule.

As to the Ba'th Party, its willingness to dissolve itself was not a matter of sacrifice, as Abu Jaber concluded. In the words of the former Secretary of the Ba'th, "the Egyptian revolution had to overcome degeneration, apathy and reactionism. No popular organization was available to help make this contribution. The Ba'thists believed that since Syria had political parties capable of extending the base already extant, union with Egypt would actually open new doors to its development both in Syria and Egypt."¹⁸⁰ But to provide the U.A.R. President with a party would in fact mean the taking over of the political apparatus. The 'new doors' were not a sacrifice, and this meaning did not escape the Egyptian President.

As Kissinger says, "many of the leaders of the new countries will be prepared to ignore the classical panoply of power, but they will be very sensitive to the threat of domestic upheaval."¹⁸¹ Thus the power struggle erupted from the outset and continued till the collapse of the union. The U.A.R. President knew that the Ba'th Party was undergoing internal conflict, rivalry with the other parties and the army. The discontent resulting from the implementation of land reform--though it

was a state policy--turned against the Ba'th. Sarraj--the Syrian military man--cooperated with the Syrian conservatives and encouraged the opposition against the Ba'th. The Ba'th ministers (posted in Cairo) were not allowed to travel to Syria because of 'pressing business', and could not campaign for their party colleagues in the National Union election. They decided to withdraw from the elections and finally resigned from the cabinet. According to Frost, the U.A.R. President had not only helped to assuage the growing opposition to his government, but he had practically eliminated a rival power.¹⁸² But the elimination of the Ba'th did not open the door to the Syrian military. As previously mentioned, the Syrian Executive Council was abolished, Marshal Amer took power in Syria, and Sarraj was appointed as a Vice President in Cairo. When Sarraj expressed resentment, he was accused of using exaggerated police methods. A decree was published in Syria forbidding the detention of any person without a warrant issued by the attorney general's office--a right the Egyptians did not enjoy.¹⁸³ Thus he was considered personally responsible for 'the state of one thousand and one spies', to use the phrase of Shukry al Kuwatly, the Syrian President who initiated the unity. The Ba'th was held responsible for abuses in the implementation of the Land Reform Law, and Sarraj was blamed for police methods, while the U.A.R. President remained not accountable in both cases.

It is interesting to note that at this particular time of the dispute with Sarraj, the former ministers of the Ba'th were given pensions.¹⁸⁴ Etzioni holds that the U.A.R. President was not consistent when "he initially let the Ba'th turn the socialist revolution into a private and party vendetta...then he let Amer try a revisionist approach which Nasser should have realised would be contrary to his other plans."¹⁸⁵

In this writer's opinion, it is neither radicalism nor revisionism. Etzioni thought in ideological terms but the U.A.R. President did not. He was engaged in a power struggle, and used competing powers against each other. At the same time he used them all as scapegoats for his policy to appease the public and used the public discontent as an excuse to eliminate his rivals.

The net result was the creation of a power vacuum. His original plan was to eliminate all political powers and institutions, and establish the National Union as the only popular organization. Three weeks after the secession crisis, in a speech of self-criticism, he said that the National Union was paralyzed because reactionary elements were let into it and because of opportunism.¹⁸⁶ The Arab Socialist Union replaced the National Union, but seven years later, in another wave of self-criticism, following the 1967 war crisis, the U.A.R. President's spokesman wrote in a number of articles that the Arab Socialist Union was a failure due to the built-in centers of power and opportunism and lack of freedom of discussion.¹⁸⁷

Integration failed, and it was admitted by the U.A.R. President in the Tripartite Unity talks that there was a power vacuum.¹⁸⁸ There was an attempt to build up a system of downward communication, through the National Union (but not vice versa). Etzioni was right when he said that there was a continuous upward flow of intelligence information, and even if they contain valid information they have no power-backing the way the communication of representatives has in a democratic system.¹⁸⁹ But he was not right when he said that the National Union was successful to a degree in Egypt.¹⁹⁰ Contrary to Etzioni's opinion, the secession crisis proved the failure of the National Union, and the 1967 war crisis

proved the failure of the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt also. Whatever the reasons given, these organizations shared a common factor in that they were governmental, non-democratic organizations.

This study shows that the power struggle is a decisive factor that leads to disintegration. The Syrians agreed to yield power to the U.A.R. President in 'good faith', i.e. they obviously expected not to lose power, but rather to be rewarded for initiating the unity. It is in the nature of any military regime not to give up power voluntarily. Its birth--whatever the motives may be--is illegitimate. The authority and the responsibility are concentrated in individuals. Inevitably, they are rulers for life until they are removed, by a violent and not a peaceful struggle. Therefore, neither the military nor the absolute rulers are likely to accept integration, which would mean a loss of their power. The U.A.R. President's conditions were to guarantee that his absolute powers were not to be affected. If for 'accidental reasons', to use Marshal Zahr El-Din's phrase, one party agrees to a loss of power, this agreement is temporary, and a struggle for power is bound to follow. Thus, in absolute and military regimes, power considerations are the most important factors that affect the process of integration. But in spite of the violent nature of the power struggle, there is a tendency to accept separation instead of using violence so long as the integration process is not developed, as violence is likely to be identified with external conquest.

4. Loss of Economic Power: For the purpose of this study, it is necessary to discuss the political problems resulting from economic integration. Under the development plan, the investments in Syrian agriculture amounted

to 51 percent of the total investment, while the investment in industry
 191
 was about 19 percent. According to Frost the emphasis on agriculture
 and not industry was natural. As a part of the U.A.R., Syria's capabilities
 were in the area of agriculture, and it was best qualified to
 192
 serve as the 'bread basket' of the new state. Moreover, Syria underwent
 a severe drought that lasted through the period of the union--a
 good reason for emphasizing investment in irrigation projects. But this
 was not the perception of the Syrians, as industrialization in the developing
 countries is identified with modernization even at the expense of
 the economic use of natural advantages. The plan did not take into consideration
 the political and economic aspirations of the Syrians, and ignored the need
 for a balanced development in the agricultural and industrial sectors.
 However, development is measured not on an absolute scale but on a relative
 one, because with the process of integration a comparative study between
 the economies of the integrating parts becomes an essential factor that
 shapes politics. Egypt exhausted the possibilities for agricultural
 development with the building of the High Dam, and industrialization
 became a must for its development, but Syria had many possibilities
 for agricultural development which were not yet exhausted. Therefore,
 the investment in industry was about 19 percent in Syria and 46 percent
 in Egypt. Thus, balanced growth was lost, because originally there
 were two levels of development. The image that this economic relation
 was of a colonialist type was built up regardless of whether the plan
 was a rational objective policy or not. In a joint statement, the
 Syrian Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture declared that
 industrialization was blocked, and Syria was converted into an agricultural
 193
 country.

What intensified these problems was the fact that the decision was made in Cairo, by the centralized authority, and without consultation. The Syrian Minister of Economy complained that he had been faced with an accomplished fact.¹⁹⁴ The present study shows that if several states are integrated into a unitary system, resentments are more apt to be provoked than if integration had led to a federal state first.

As to the problem of competition and complementarity, Frost holds that the economic sectors of the two countries cannot be considered complementary because their basic exportable commodities are similar, and they are both considered developing states with industrialization at its primary stage.¹⁹⁵ It is true that cotton exports from Syria, including cotton seed, amounted to no less than 62 percent of Syria's total export,¹⁹⁶ and it is also true that the principal Egyptian export is cotton.¹⁹⁷ But in actual fact, there is no competition with respect to this principal commodity because Syria produces a medium-staple cotton, and Egypt specializes in long-staple cotton. As for wheat, Egypt imports it, whereas Syria used to export it, until the prolonged drought resulted in a fall in its production beyond the needs of the Syrian home market.¹⁹⁸

In the industrial sector, the requirement of licences for trade between the two provinces was abolished, but the freeing of trade between Egypt and Syria was not welcomed by many industrialists in the Northern Region who feared Egyptian competition, as the Egyptian industrial sector was much more highly developed and labor costs were much lower than in Syria.¹⁹⁹

The problem of development and competition between the two economies of Egypt and Syria was felt politically, and forced the U.A.R. President to say that "he had given orders for the establishment of any kind of

industry to be permitted in the Syrian Region even though such an industry might already exist in the Egyptian Region.

Economic integration is a very complex process. In every situation, there are similarities and dissimilarities, and there is competition and cooperation side by side. It depends not only on the type of economy, whether it is agriculturally or industrially developed, but also on the types of commodities, their weight in the economy and the tastes of consumers. The Arab leaders dealt with economic integration in political terms, either pursuing the goal of Arab unity or withdrawing hastily under pressure.

In the area of commercial relations between the two regions, there were serious accusations that Egypt exploited the situation in its own interest. For example, Egypt did not pay Syria the debt resulting from the purchases of wheat. Syria had to pay for Egyptian sugar above the world price. In actual fact commercial relations depend on market prices, bargaining and making the right decision. But when integration takes the form of a unitary state, the decision of the centralized authority inevitably leads to dispute and protest on the part of the amalgamated region, because of the nature of commercial relations. There is also no guarantee for securing the interests of the weaker partner under the system of a unitary state.

In conclusion, the economic gradualist method is a prerequisite for political unification though this method would not automatically trigger political unification as the functionalists claimed. The Arab leaders thought in political terms, and established a unitary state but this did not withstand the repercussions of economic integration.

5. Rewards, Capabilities and Political Issues: The image of the rewards of the union as formed by the U.A.R. President were: Israel was held in check, the imperialist powers impressed, the army built up, and huge sums were invested in development. However, the main purpose of the union was
202
the creation of a socialist society.

It is evident that the political side of the rewards of union were stressed by him, especially with respect to foreign policy. Charismatic leaders tend to channel internal economic crises outwards. To re-establish the legitimacy of their rule, a dramatic foreign policy is particularly
203
apt; to use Kissinger's phrase. On the other hand, the secessionist movement accused the U.A.R. President of tolerating the existence of
204
Israel, which was expected to be 'wiped out'.

The U.A.R. President stressed the political side to overshadow the failure of the union economically. The land reform, financial restrictions, and nationalization caused the flight of capital. The value of the Syrian lira on the Lebanese exchange, sank by nearly twenty percent. The gold and foreign currency reserves of Syria declined by twenty-two percent. The Syrian income per capita fell from 592 Syrian Lira in 1957 to 466 in 1960. The Syrian national debt had almost doubled in terms of
205
percentage of the national income. There was a food shortage, especially in wheat, which was due to the drought, and the value of imports in the first half of 1961 dropped to 319 million Syrian Lira as compared with
206
384 million Syrian Lira during the same period in 1960. The ordinary man felt the economic crisis, the development plan consisted of long-run projects such as the Euphrates Dam, and their potential yield could not lighten the immediate crisis. When the secession movement erupted there

was undeniable popular support for it. To relate this movement to the right wing elements alone is a partial interpretation.

Thus, political appeals such as Arab unity, had to be sustained with economic rewards. But long-run projects could not withstand the immediate economic crisis.

V - CONCLUSIONS

1. Societal homogeneity with respect to religion and culture did not prevent the failure of the Egyptian-Syrian union. Though societal homogeneity is a helpful condition for integration, this study shows that the maintenance of the union depends on other factors which lie mainly in the political and economic realm.
2. Homogeneous societal factors need to be politicized and structured in order to be operative politically. For this reason, an unstructured depoliticized religion like Islam could not be an autonomous driving force politically, except during the period of its emergence. Yet, this does not prevent the political elites from manipulating religion in order to achieve integration. The manipulation of religion is apt to harm the integration process because on the one hand, a depoliticized religion is unable to sustain the integration, and on the other hand the manipulation of religion is apt to stir the dissent of minorities.
3. As regards the common cultural heritage, it ceases to be an autonomous integrative force under non-democratic system, because of the alienation of the intellectuals. Cultural homogeneity is neutralized in that it does not handicap the integration process, but it does not provide it with an integrative power either.
4. As regards political ideology, the present study shows that ideological homogeneity is a prerequisite for a political union. Only a loose confederal union such as the Arab League can include several states with different ideologies. Yet this study also shows that ideological homogeneity could not sustain the union. A commitment to socialism as a goal and the

agreement to adopt a gradualist method for its implementation did not hold together the political elites as they were engaged in a power struggle since the outset of the union. With respect to the people, the role of political ideology as an integrative factor becomes less effective in military regimes, since socialism is imposed 'from above' and the formulation of a theory comes later in order to communicate to the people what has already become an accomplished fact.

5. The more one ideology encompasses an expansionist doctrine, the greater the power struggle between the political elites of the contending states. This impeded the full utilization of the Arab League and handicapped its implementation of a functionalist integrative process. On the other hand, such an expansionist doctrine helped to build up the image of a charismatic leadership, but the case study showed the 'failure of the charisma' and that the 'hero personality' alone could not sustain the union in the absence of supporting factors. Thus an expansionist doctrine is a disintegrative factor unless integration is identified with power and conquest.

6. As regards the nature of social change suitable for the maintenance of the union, the study shows that the early and drastic imposition of socialism was a disintegrative factor. On the one hand, it was imposed at an early stage in the establishment of the union, which had not yet acquired enough power and momentum to curb the repercussions of such a policy. On the other hand, an early and drastic change was a violation of the basic principles on which the union was established. It is evident that the need for such a change did not arise within the short period of two years following the establishment of the union and that this drastic change was not a response to the emergence of a new situation. Thus the

study shows that a reformist political change is more helpful than a rapid and drastic change to sustain the union.

7. The study shows that political considerations were the most important factors which triggered the political union. The external threat, in addition to an internal political crisis, led Syria to initiate the political union with Egypt, which shared with Syria an ultra-nationalistic policy. The conclusion of defense, economic and cultural agreements were the outcome of the political situation. However, the external threat alone is not sufficient as an interpretation for the problem of integration since it was met by the implementation of the Defense Pact. It seems that the union provided a feeling of security in that the two nations wished to share a common fate.

The study also shows that the integrative effect of the external threat was limited to the period of initiation, but it could not sustain the integration process. The union failed in spite of the permanent tension in the Middle East. The economic repercussions of the union, the rewards and the losses and the power struggle became the dominant factors which overshadowed the external threat.

8. As regards the economic sector, this study shows that in spite of similarities between the economies of the integrating states whether agricultural or industrial, a complementary economic situation may still be developed. This depends on the types of commodities, their weight in the economy and the tastes of consumers.

The study also shows that in using a relative rather than an absolute scale, economic polarization is apt to take place even between the economies of developing countries, and not only between those of developed and developing countries. When economic integration takes place, there is a tendency for growing specialization of each country in those lines

of production in which it has a comparative advantage over the other. Stressing the agricultural development in one country because of an economic advantage it may have in this sector may lead to an integrated complementary economy, but it may at the same time frustrate the political needs for industrialization. The study shows that a balanced development in both the agricultural and industrial sectors even at the expense of the benefits of specialization is a prerequisite for successful political integration. However, this conclusion is limited to the period of initiation, where it is necessary to avoid the early repercussions of polarization until the union acquires sufficient momentum and integrative power to be able to balance these losses which are apt to harm the weaker partner.

The study also shows that it is advisable to adopt a gradualist policy to achieve economic integration prior to the establishment of the political union. This conclusion is not based on the assumption that economic integration would trigger the political integration automatically, but because this method enables the integrating partners to achieve a coordinated and complementary economy on an egalitarian basis. Otherwise, the political union--especially if it takes the form of a unitary state--would be held responsible for the economic repercussions of integration.

9. As regards the institutional approach, the study shows that political polarization is apt to take place. Thus each region's influence over the union's course was proportional to its real power. A unitary state hastens the process of concentrating power in favor of the stronger partner and is apt to provoke resentment.

The study also shows that the establishment of a unitary state prior

to the implementation of a gradual economic integration is premature. Nevertheless, the study shows that in spite of the ills of a premature unitary state, charismatic leadership tends to prefer this system to the federal state.

10. As regards the government machinery, its efficiency is a prerequisite for the integration process. The study shows that the inefficiency of the government machinery was due to the political system. Absolutism tends to centralize and over concentrate authority beyond the ability of one man resulting in the inefficiency of the government machinery and thus the integration process is handicapped.

11. The study shows that the lack of democratic institutions such as political parties or other participatory organs was a disintegrative factor because it resulted in the absence of communication and involvement. The integration process was imposed by force and under such circumstances integration is identified with conquest.

FOOTNOTES

1

C. Ernest Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism in Syria", The Middle East Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (Spring, 1962), p. 145.

2

Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change (New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 196.

3

George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movements (London, Hamilton, 1938), p. 114.

4

M.F. Anabtawi, Arab Unity in Terms of Law (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. 10.

5

Ibid., p. 11.

6

Robert G. Neumann, "The Near East After the Syrian Coup", The Year Book of World Affairs, Vol. XVI (London: Stevens and Sons Limited, 1962), p. 82.

7

Richard H. Pfaff, "The Function of Arab Nationalism", Comparative Politics, Vol. II, No. 2 (January, 1970), pp. 147-151.

8

Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 309.

9

Ibid., p. 203.

10

Ibid., p. 204.

11

Muhsin Hamdy, Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 206.

12

John C. Campbell, "The Role of the Military in the Middle East", The Military in the Middle East, ed. Sydney Nettelton Fisher (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963), pp. 107-111.

13

P. J. Vatikiotis, Egyptian Army in Politics: Pattern for New Nations (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1961), p. 193.

14

Jean Vigneau, "The Ideology of the Egyptian Revolution", The Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958), p. 137.

15

Anauar Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 248.

16

P. J. Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 193-197.

17

Manfred Halpern, op. cit., p. 218.

18

Muhsin Hamdy, op. cit., p. 252.

19

Manfred Halpern, op. cit., p. 351.

20

P. J. Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 193.

21

Anouar Abdel-Malek, op. cit., pp. 256, 428.

22

Ibid., p. 248.

23

Richard H. Pfaff, op. cit., p. 251.

24

Birnamig March 30, Sharh Wa Tahlil (Program of March 30), Wazarat al-Ershad Al-Qawmi (Ministry of National Guidance), n.d., pp. 74-76.

25

Sylvia G. Haim, "Islam and the History of Arab Nationalism", The Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958), p. 302.

26

Manfred Halpern, op. cit., p. 206.

27

M. F. Anabtawi, op. cit., pp. 30-32.

28

Paul E. Sigmund, The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 159.

29

Richard H. Pfaff, op. cit., p. 154.

30

Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification. A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Inc., 1965), p. 105.

31

Ibid.

32

Anouar Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 258.

33

Manfred Halpern, op. cit., p. 368.

34

Anouar Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 258.

35

Mahadir Galasat Mobahesat Al-Wahda (Minutes of Unity Talks), Kutub Qawmiyah (National Books), April 17, 1963, pp. 365-368.

36

Anouar Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 261.

37

Georges Ketman, "The Egyptian Intellegentsia", The Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958), p. 482.

38

Muhammad Kamel Ayyad, "The Future of Culture in Arab Society", The Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958), p. 471.

39

Anouar Abdel-Malek, op. cit., pp. 189-195.

40

Muhammad Kamel Ayyad, op. cit., p. 463.

41

Al-Ahram (Cairo), May 24, 1968.

42

Ibid., May 31, 1968.

43

Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 417.

44

Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 271-272.

45

Joel Carmichael, "The Nationalist Communist Symbiosis in the Middle East", Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John H. Kautsky (New York: John Willey & Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 310.

46

Henry A. Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 272.

47

Anouar Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 189

48

Al-Mithaq (The Charter), United Arab Republic, May 21, 1962, pp. 6-53.

49

Middle East Record 1961, Vol. II (Tel Aviv University), The Reuven Shiloah Research Center, n.d., p. 621.

50

Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda (Minutes of Unity Talks), op. cit., p. 43.

51

P.J. Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 68.

52

Henry A. Kissinger, "The Policy Maker and the Intellectual", Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy, ed. Andre M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), pp. 326-329.

53

P.J. Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 249-251.

54

Walter Z. Laqueur, "Syria: Nationalism and Communism", The Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958), p. 333.

55

Anouar Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 298.

56

Manfred Halpern, op. cit., pp. 365-366.

57

Al-Mithaq, (The Charter), op. cit., p. 81.

58

Wolfgang Leonard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963), pp. 123-127.

59

Manfred Halpern, op. cit., p. 407.

60

John Kautsky, Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 88.

61

Joel Carmichael, op. cit., p. 310.

62

Wolfgang Leonard, op. cit., p. 127.

63

Kamel Abu Jabir, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (New York: Syracuse University, 1966), p. 102.

64

Anouar Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 295.

65

Hans Tiesch, "Arab Unity and Arab Dissention", The Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958), p. 23.

66

Kamel Abu Jabir, op. cit., p. 97.

67

Ibid., pp. 100-147.

68

Manfred Halpern, op. cit., pp. 235-239.

69

Ibid., p. 245

70

A.K. Zuhur, "Fial-Fikr al-Siyasi" (On Political Thought), (Damaskus: Dar Dimishq, 1963), pp. 142-157.

71

Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda (Minutes of Unity Talks), op. cit., pp. 300-308.

72

M.F. Anabtawi, op. cit., pp. 253-254.

73

Anouar Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 294.

74

Ibid., p. 296.

75

John Kautsky, op. cit., p. 76.

76

Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda (Minutes of Unity Talks), op. cit., pp. 162-164.

77

Al-Mithaq (The Charter), op. cit., p. 66.

78

Carl Robert Frost, "The United Arab Republic, 1958-1961: A Study in Arab Nationalism and Unity", (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Faculty of the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, October, 1966), p. 108.

79

Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda, op. cit., p. 368.

80

Ibid., pp. 351-591.

81

Paul E. Sigmund, op. cit., p. 152.

82

Kamel Abu Jabir, op. cit., pp. 132-133.

83

Ibid., p. 127.

84

Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1956), p. 168.

85

Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda (Minutes of Unity Talks), op. cit., p. 307.

86

Hans Tuesch, op. cit., p. 12.

87

Kamel Abu Jabir, op. cit., p. 106.

88

Anouar Abel-Malek, op. cit., p. 295.

89

Paul. E. Sigmund, op. cit., p. 164.

90

Anouar Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 293.

91

Ibid., p. 296.

92

Gebran Majdalany, "The Arab Socialist Movement", The Middle East in Transition, p. 339.

93

W. Khalidi, "Political Trends in the Fertile Crescent", The Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958), pp. 124-125.

94

Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda (Minutes of Unity Talks), op. cit., p. 301.

95

Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 112-131.

96

Anouar Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 293.

97

Eva Garzouzi, "Land Reform in Syria", The Middle East Journal, Vol. XVII (Winter, Spring, 1963), p. 85.

98

Al-Ahram (Cairo), August 9, 1967.

99

Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda (Minutes of Unity Talks), op. cit., p. 270.

100

M. F. Anabtawi, op. cit., pp. 177-181.

101

Ibid., p. 233.

102

Oded Remba, "The Middle East in 1961: An Economic Survey", Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (March, 1962), Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, Inc., (January, 1962), p. 66.

103

Al-Mithaq (The Charter), op. cit., p. 137.

104

Majmu'at Kutab Watasriaat (A Collection of Speeches and Talks),
Vol. II (Press United Arab Republic), p. 409.

105

Ibid., p. 136.

106

Harry Schwartz, Prague's Zoo Days, (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1969), p. 182.

107

Kamel Abu Jabir, op. cit., p. xiii.

108

Near East Report April 10, 1962, Vol. VI, No. 8, p. 29.

109

Kamel Abu Jabir, op. cit., p. xiii.

110

Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda (Minutes of the Unity Talks),
op. cit., p. 295.

111

M. F. Anabtawi, op. cit., p. 175.

112

Ibid., p. 108.

113

Ibid., p. 109.

114

Robert C. Neumann, op. cit., p. 82.

115

M. F. Anabtawi, op. cit., pp. 126-150.

116

Al-Ahram (Cairo), February 10, 1967.

117

M. F. Anabtawi, op. cit., p. 238.

118

Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda (Minutes of Unity Talks),
op. cit., pp. 418-419.

119

Middle East Record, op. cit., p. 617.

120

Marshal Abd Al-Karim Zahr El-Din, Muzakirati 'an Fatrat Al-Enfisal (My Memoires of the Secession Period), (Beyrouth: Dar-El-Ittihad, 1968), pp. 102-106.

121

M. H. Heykal, Ma Allazi Gara Fi Syria (What Happened in Syria), (Cairo: Ad-Dar as Kawmiyyah Littibaa' Wal-Nashr, 1962), pp. 65-73.

122

Middle East Record, op. cit., p. 561.

123

Al-Ahram (Cairo), February 8, 1968.

124

Eva Garzouzi, op. cit., p. 84.

125

Ibid., p. 83.

126

Middle East Record, op. cit., p. 568.

127

M. F. Anabtawi, op. cit., p. 178.

128

M. H. Heykal, op. cit., pp. 30-34.

129

Ibid., p. 61.

130

Ibid., p. 34.

131

M. F. Anabtawi, op. cit. p. 175.

132

M. H. Heykal, op. cit., p. 36.

133

Carl Robert Frost, op. cit., p. 108.

134

Ibid., p. 134.

135

Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda (Minutes of Unity Talks), op. cit., p. 7.

136

Ibid., p. 27.

137

Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", International Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 273.

138

Al-Mithaq (The Charter), op. cit., p. 137.

139

Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", International Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 273.

140

Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda (Minutes of Unity Talks), op. cit., p. 11.

141

Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", International Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 273.

142

Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

143

Carl R. Frost, op. cit., pp. 94-97.

144

David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence", International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 390.

145

Carl R. Frost, op. cit., p. 97.

146

David Singer, op. cit., p. 385.

147

Carl R. Frost, op. cit., p. 90.

148

Ibid.

149

Elie Kedourie, "Pan Arabism and British Policy", The Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter A. Laqueur (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958), pp. 107-108.

150

M. F. Anabtawi, op. cit., p. 168.

151

Al-Ahram (Cairo), February 9, 1968.

152

Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment (New York: Devin-Aduir Company, 1958), pp. 228-230.

153

M. F. Anabtawi, op. cit., p. 177-180.

154

Ibid.

155

Marshal Abd El-Bizri, Al-Nassiriyat Fi Gumlat Al-Isti'mar Al-Hadith (Nasserism, a Neo-Colonialism), (Damascus: Dar Al-Shark, 1962), pp. 319-320.

156

Marshal Abd El-Karim Zahr El-Din, op. cit., p. 76.

157

Carl R. Frost, op. cit., pp. 165-166.

158

Ibid., p. 179.

159

Ibid., p. 243.

160

Ibid., p. 288.

161

Luther Gulick and James Pollock, "Government Reorganization in the U.A.R.", Unpublished Report Submitted to the Central Committee for the Reorganization of the Machinery of the Government (Cairo, June, 1962), p. 15.

162

M. F. Anabtawi, op. cit., p. 226.

163

Seymour Martin Lipset, "Bureaucracy and Social Change", Reader in Bureaucracy, ed. Robert K. Merton (New York: The Free Press, 1952), p. 221.

164

Luther Gulick and James Pollock, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

165

Ibid., p. 8.

166

Al-Ahram (Cairo), March 13, 1964.

167

Luther Gulick and James Pollock, op. cit., p. 8.

168

Carl R. Frost, op. cit., p. 217.

169

Middle East Record, op. cit., p. 618.

170

Marshal Abd El-Karim Zahr El-Din, op. cit., p. 80.

171

Marshal Afif El-Bizri, op. cit., p. 314.

172

Carl R. Frost, op. cit., p. 108.

173

Kamel Abu Jabir, op. cit., p. 149.

174

Carl R. Frost, op. cit., p. 140.

175

Marshal Abd El-Karim Zahr El-Din, op. cit., p. 16.

176

Middle East Record, op. cit., p. 602.

177

Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., p. 131.

178

Marshal Abd El-Karim Zahr El-Din, op. cit., p. 43.

179

Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., p. 131.

180

Carl R. Frost, op. cit., 152.

181

Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy",
International Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 273.

182

Carl R. Frost, op. cit., p. 242.

183

M. H. Heykal, op. cit., p. 114.

- 184
Middle East Record, op. cit., p. 603.
- 185
Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., p. 132.
- 186
M. F. Anabtawi, op. cit., pp. 226-227.
- 187
Al-Ahram (Cairo), November 1, 8, 15, 1968.
- 188
Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda (Minutes of Unity Talks),
op. cit., p. 14.
- 189
Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., p. 128.
- 190
Ibid., p. 126.
- 191
Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., p. 134.
- 192
Carl R. Frost, op. cit., p. 213.
- 193
Middle East Record, op. cit., p. 619.
- 194
Carl R. Frost, op. cit., p. 412.
- 195
Ibid., p. 206.
- 196
Middle East Record, op. cit., p. 569.
- 197
The Middle East and North Africa: Egypt--Statistical Survey
(London: Europa Publications Limited, 1958), p. 114.
- 198
Middle East Record, op. cit., p. 564.
- 199
Carl R. Frost, op. cit., pp. 211-218.
- 200
Middle East Record, op. cit., p. 60

201

Carl R. Frost, op. cit., p. 227.

202

Middle East Record, op. cit., p. 619.

203

Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy",
International Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 272.

204

Marshal Abd El-Karim Zahr El-Din, op. cit., p. 19.

205

Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., p. 115.

206

Middle East Record, op. cit., p. 601.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdel-Malek, Anouar. Egypt: Military Society. New York: Random House, 1968.

Al-Ahram (Cairo): May 24, 1968.
August 8, 1967.
February 10, 1967.
February 9, 1968.
March 13, 1964.
November 1, 8, 15, 1968.

Al-Mithaq (The Charter). United Arab Republic. May 21, 1962.

Anabtawi, M. F. Arab Unity in Terms of Law. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963.

Anatonius, George. The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movements. London, Hamilton, 1938.

Atlantic Alliance. N.A.T.O.'s Role in the Free World. Report by a Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, 1952.

Ayyad, Muhammad Kamel. "The Future of Culture in Arab Society." The Middle East in Transition. Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958.

Beloff, Max. "International Integration and the Modern State." The Common Market. Progress & Controversy. Edited by Lawrence E. Krause. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

Birch, A. H. "Approaches to the Study of Federalism." Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality. Edited by J. Peter Meekison. Toronto: Methuen, 1968.

Birnamig, March 30, Sharh Wa Tahlil (Program of March 30). Wazarat Al-Ershad Al-Qawmi (Ministry of National Guidance), n.d.

Brzezinski, Ibgigniew K. Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967.

Campbell, John C. "The Role of the Military in the Middle East." The Military in the Middle East. Edited by Sydney Nettleton Fisher. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963.

Carmichael, Joel. "The Nationalist Communist Symbiosis in the Middle East." Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries. Edited by John H. Kautsky. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967.

Crick, B. In Defense of Politics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962.

- Day, A.C. "Consequences of the Common Market." The Common Market. Progress and Controversy. Edited by Lawrence B. Krause. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- Dawn, C. Ernest. "The Rise of Arabism in Syria." The Middle East Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (Spring, 1962).
- Dell, Sidney, "Economic Integration and the American Example." The Common Market. Progress and Controversy. Edited by Lawrence B. Krause. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- Deutsch, Karl W. "Communication Theory and Political Integration." The Integration of Political Communities. Edited by Phillip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano. New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1964.
- _____. "The Price of Integration." The Integration of Political Communities. Edited by Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano. New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1964.
- _____, and Edinger, Lewis J. Germany Rejoins the Powers. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959.
- _____, et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- _____, et al. France, Germany and the Western Alliance. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967.
- Donald, A., and Smiley, V. "Public Administration and Canadian Federalism." Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality. Edited by J. Peter Meekison. Toronto: Methuen, 1968.
- El-Bizri, Afif (Marshal). Al-Nassiriyat Fi Gumlat Al-Isti'mar Al-Hadith (Nasserism, a Neo-Colonialism). Damascus: Dar Al-Shark, 1962.
- El-Din, Abd Al-Karim Zahr (Marshal). Muzakirati 'an Fatrat Al-Enfisal (My Memoires of the Secession Period). Beyrouth: Dar-El-Ittihad, 1968.
- Emerson, Rupert. From Empire to Nation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.
- Etzioni, Amitai. Political Unification. A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Inc., 1965.
- _____. "The Dialectics of Supranational Unification." International Political Communities an Anthology. Original. The American Political Science Review, Vol. LVI, No. 4 (December, 1962).
- _____. "European Unification. A Strategy of Change." International Political Communities an Anthology. Original. World Politics, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (October, 1963).

- Feld, Werner. The European Common Market and the World. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967.
- Frost, Carl Robert. "The United Arab Republic, 1958-1961: A Study in Arab Nationalism and Unity." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Faculty of the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, October, 1966.
- Garzouzi, Eva. "Land Reform in Syria." The Middle East Journal, Vol. XVII (Winter, Spring, 1963).
- Guetzkow, Harold. "Long Range Research in International Relations." International Politics and Foreign Policy. Edited by James N. Rosenau. New York: The Free Press, 1969.
- Gulick, Luther, and Pollock, James. "Government Reorganizations in the U.A.R." Unpublished Report Submitted to the Central Committee for the Reorganizations of the Machinery of the Government (Cairo, June, 1962).
- Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968.
- _____. "International Integration. The European and the Universal Process." International Political Communities an Anthology. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1966. Original. International Organizations, Vol. XV, No. 4 (Autumn, 1961).
- _____, and Schmitter, Philippe C. "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections About Unity in Latin America." International Political Communities an Anthology. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1966. Original. International Organization, Vol. XVIII (Autumn, 1964).
- Haim, Sylvia G. "Islam and the History of Arab Nationalism." The Middle East in Transition. Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958.
- Hallstein, Walter. "N.A.T.O. and the European Economic Community." The Common Market. Progress and Controversy. Edited by Lawrence B. Krause. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- Halpern, Manfred. The Politics of Social Change. New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Hamdy, Muhsin. Ibn Dhaldun's Philosophy of History. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964.
- Hansen, Roger D. "Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts." World Politics, Vol. XXI, No. 2 (January, 1969).

- Heykal, M. H. Ma Allazi Gara Fi Syria (What Happened in Syria). Cairo: Ad-Dar al Kawmiyyah Littibaa' Wal-Nashr, 1962.
- Hoffmann, Stanley. "Discord in Community. The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System." The Atlantic Community, Progress and Prospects. Edited by Francis O. Wilcox, H. Field Haviland. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.
- Jabir, Kamel Abu. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. New York: Syracuse University, 1966.
- Jacob, Philip E., and Teune, Henry. "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community." The Integration of Political Communities. Edited by Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano. New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1964.
- Kautsky, John. Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967.
- Kedourie, Elie. "Pan-Arabism and British Policy." The Middle East in Transition. Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958.
- Kelman, Herbert C. "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy." International Politics and Foreign Policy. Edited by James N. Rosenau. New York: The Free Press, 1969.
- Ketman, Georges. "The Egyptian Intellegantsia." The Middle East in Transition. Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958.
- Khalidi, W. "Political Trends in the Fertile Crescent." The Middle East in Transition. Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958.
- Kissinger, Henry A. "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy." International Politics and Foreign Policy. Edited by James N. Rosenau. New York: The Free Press, 1969.
- _____. "The Policy Maker and the Intellectual." Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy. Edited by Andre M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965.
- Laqueur, Walter Z. Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1956.
- _____. "Syria: Nationalism and Communism." The Middle East in Transition. Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958.
- Lawson, Ruth C., ed. International Regional Organizations. Constitutional Foundations. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.

- Leonard, Wolfgang. The Kremlin Since Stalin. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963.
- Levi, Werner. "The Relative Irrelevance of Moral Norms in International Politics." International Politics and Foreign Policy. Edited by James N. Rosenau. New York: The Free Press, 1969.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Bureaucracy and Social Change." Reader in Bureaucracy. Edited by Robert K. Merton. New York: The Free Press, 1952.
- Livingston, W. S. "A Note on the Nature of Federalism." Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality. Edited by J. Peter Meekison. Toronto: Methuen, 1968.
- Mahadir Galasat Mobahasat Al-Wahda (Minutes of Unity Talks). Kutub Qawmiyah (National Books), April 17, 1963.
- Majdalany, Gebran. "The Arab Socialist Movement." The Middle East in Transition. Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958.
- Majmu'at Kutab Watasriaat (A Collection of Speeches and Talks), Vol. II, Press United Arab Republic.
- Middle East Record 1961, Vol. II, Tel Aviv University. The Reuven Shiloah Research Center, n.d.
- Monnet, Jean. "A Ferment of Change." The Common Market. Progress and Controversy. Edited by Lawrence B. Krause. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.
- _____. "Power and Ideology in International Politics." International Politics and Foreign Policy. Edited by James N. Rosenau. New York: The Free Press, 1969.
- Nagel, Ernest. The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Bruce & World, 1961.
- Near East Report April, 10, 1962, Vol. VI, No. 8.
- Neumann, Robert G. "The Near East After the Syrian Coup." The Year Book of World Affairs, Vol. XVI. London: Setevens and Sons Limited, 1962.
- Pfaff, Richard H. "The Function of Arab Nationalism." Comparative Politics, Vol. II, No. 2 (January, 1970).
- Remba, Oded. "The Middle East in 1961: An Economic Survey." Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (March, 1962). Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, Inc., (January, 1962).

- Ricker, W.H. Federalism: Origin, Operation and Significance. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1964.
- Sayegh, Fayez A. Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment. New York: Devin-Aduir Company, 1958.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. "The Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration." International Organization, Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1969).
- Schokking, Jean J., and Anderson, Nels. "Observations of the European Integration Process." Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IV, No. 4 (December, 1960).
- Schwartz, Harry, Prague's 200 Days. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1969.
- Sigmund, Paul E. The Ideologies of the Developing Nations. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
- Singer, David. "Inter-Nation Influence." International Politics and Foreign Policy. Edited by James N. Rosenau. New York: The Free Press, 1969.
- Stalin, Joseph. Marxism and the National and Colonial Question. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1936.
- Tuesch, Hans. "Arab Unity and Arab Dissention." The Middle East in Transition. Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958.
- Vatikiotis, P.J. Egyptian Army in Politics: Pattern for New Nations. Bloomington: Indiana University, 1961.
- Vigneau, Jean. "The Ideology of the Egyptian Revolution." The Middle East in Transition. Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958.
- Zuhur, A.K. "Fial-Fikr Al-Siyasi" (On Political Thought). Damascus: Dar Dimishq, 1963.

B29949